

Review Article:
The Multiple Horizons of Sikh Orthodoxy:
Tradition, Fantasy, and Modern Temporality

Rajbir Singh Judge
University of California, Davis

This review article examines the colonial temporal framework embedded within Arvind-Pal Mandair's *Religion and the Specter of the West*. By privileging these colonial understandings of temporality that demand rupture within a unilinear timeline, this article posits that Mandair masks the inconsistencies within the modern thereby reifying the phantasmatic conditions of its plentitude. In contrast to privileging this ideological fantasy that incessantly effaces the conditions of its impossibility, I argue that we should highlight the multiple temporal presences within tradition that exist as interruptions, disturbances, and disjunctures, which allow us to explore the numerous unnoticed possibilities continuously articulated within the Sikh tradition.

In this review article, I examine the temporal logic that governs the analytical and political framework in Arvind-Pal Mandair's *Religion and the Specter of the West*. I begin by briefly explicating Mandair's arguments and the normative political claims that arise from them. After this short foray, I outline how, in order to release non-colonial politics, Mandair privileges colonial renderings of temporality that demand a rupture point within a unilinear timeline. Finally, throughout, I try to sketch how scholars in Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies have delineated more productive conceptions of time and tradition in which serious political possibilities are always simultaneously present (and absent) in a historical situation even though fantasy continuously (and subsequently) seeks to efface their presence. In doing so, I hope to show how these non-linear formulations and experiences of time can help us "acknowledge other modes of being" and politics, which both coincide and conflict with the *theoretico-political* concerns of the scholar.¹

In *Religion and the Specter of the West*, Mandair critiques the spectral presence of Hegelian proclivities that (dis)order the Sikh tradition after the advent of colonial rule. These presences, Mandair argues, emplot/translate Sikhism onto a Western ontotheological schema that looks to make Sikhism comprehensible for comparison to the West. Mandair contends that entry into this schema rendered Sikhism into a nationalist identity that mimetically reinscribes Sikhism as a closed belief system as demanded by colonial ideology. This mimesis continually represses pre-modern forms that can no longer provide possibility for thinking otherwise in our “globalatinized” world. Yet Mandair argues that an opportunity for “thinking beyond [the] narrow ideology” of the Sikh nationalist idiom and for critique outside this Western hermeneutic frame has now appeared in our present moment (26). This opportunity, Mandair posits, now allows for a re-reading of texts that eschew colonial metaphysical assumptions, thereby, reopening tradition to contestations from within.

Mandair argues these contestations within tradition cease because of the induction/conversion into Western modernity inaugurated through various political technologies and the conceptual demands of the Western ontotheological tradition. One example of this “conversion,” Mandair argues, is particularly striking: the translation of the *Guru Granth Sahib* by Ernest Trumpp published in 1877. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, Mandair posits that this is a site of trauma that inaugurates the colonized into a colonial symbolic order. Mandair theorizes that Trumpp shifted the “conceptual terminology in any future debate or discourse concerning Sikhism” onto the domain of theology, thus, repressing Sikh concepts and forms (191). Trumpp’s translation, therefore, functioned to “demarcate conceptual boundaries for the study of Sikhism” that provided a “framework that interpreters could contest but never remain outside of” (191-192). This site of trauma, Trumpp’s translation, was a central point in refiguring a Sikh “theology” and nationalist consciousness, which is then reproduced mimetically. For Mandair, this mimesis established, in my appropriation of the work of Adrian Johnston, “a false sense of [colonial] reality’s unsurpassable, unruffled plenitude.”²

Mandair, however, ignores the false sense of this reality and privileges its plenitude. Thus, he argues that in order to overcome this totalizing injunction of the colonial order that repressed non-modern concepts and sutured Sikh consciousness in a manner to make tradition static, Sikhs need to rupture the nationalist idiom that made *Sikhi* into an identity—a possibility opened in the early 1990s due to the failure of Sikh insurgents at the hands of the Indian State.

This particular failure, Mandair contends, rather than its continuous breakdown, opened a space for critical self-introspection that can lead to new readings of central texts of the Sikh tradition. These new readings, for Mandair, can release concepts from the colonial metaphysical structure that imprisoned them by “revisiting and reopening the site of original lack” that does not merely repeat the origins (19). Such readings, Mandair argues, then offer the possibility to “rupture the ongoing treadmill of nationalist identification” and re-open tradition to a process of contestation (19).

However, these readings are not a return to an unadulterated past, but rather a style of reading Mandair calls “un-translation”: a project that seeks to see how the work of translation itself depends on the inability to translate. Un-translation occurs in multiple sites, though Mandair points to one critical location that has fostered crucial reflection: hetero-lingual spaces, which exist in both West and non-West, for example, in “television, radio, and the Internet” (426). Though these spaces are hampered by the designation of multiculturalism, Mandair argues they offer a space of resistance for within each people both translate and un-translate eschewing the universality proclaimed by the dominant language. Thus, this multifaceted project of un-translation, Mandair claims, can make South Asians “confident again about asserting ancient and very practical notions of freedom and action based on the nondual One”—a new stage of human history that is open to the universal values embedded within South Asian, which he also terms Indic, tradition (430).

If the process of subjectification, however, following Lacan, remains incomplete and cannot produce a complete/unified reality (interpellation, as Slavoj Žižek argues, as a “traumatic, senseless, injunction” that then produces a capitalist modernity that is “necessarily inconsistent”) then we cannot explicate the modern as a completed rupture point within a unilinear temporality that signals the advent of the new as it tells itself (a fantasy that seeks to efface the residue of the trauma).³ Rather, we must examine modernity as an incomplete and inconsistent project that seeks to cultivate a set of dispositions and sensibilities based on particular understandings of the human and the body through various strategies of governance and political technologies that looks to create the fullness of rupture.⁴ The modern as a totality marked by rupture, thus, is a fantasy, retroactively posited, that seeks to maintain its form and mask its inconsistencies—sustain its plentitude. This means that we cannot, nor should we attempt to, locate a singular rupture moment in a unilinear temporality that inaugurates Sikhism into/out of an ontotheological schema and a nationalist

idiom, as *modern*, for we would uphold the fantasy of colonial modernity by affirming the very logic of progress it seeks to establish. Indeed, as Talal Asad aptly argues, “claiming something as modern is a kind of closure.”⁵

By privileging the phantasmatic temporal logic of modernity, Mandair sleights possibilities that are always simultaneously present and absent within a historical situation.⁶ Mandair ignores the all too important questions that seek to examine the unnoticed possibilities of a given historical situation such as: what narratives get elided in the singular homogenous time of the West that privileges a secular body and historicity? Instead, Mandair seeks to answer another slightly more problematic question: when is critique possible? When is the moment of recognition of lack, to “exit this cycle” of repetition, going to appear within the Sikh tradition?⁷ Mandair’s line of inquiry means that subaltern communities inhabiting a temporal space of multiplicity cannot traverse fantasy through, what Lacan terms, an Act.⁸ Rather, fantasy has to be continuously proven incorrect by exposing the *aporia* of modern translation—translation is possible only through the recognition of its impossibility. One method Mandair provides to recognize this impossibility is that Sikhs and Western scholars need to work through Trumpp’s categories of analysis—forcing one looking to contest this framework to adopt the very logic one looked to challenge. Yet, in a particularly Hegelian twist, Mandair’s milieu, as diasporic subjects embedded within heterolingual spaces, are the best suited to engage in this project of un-translation/deconstruction in order to free us all from the constraints of the colonial symbolic order and resuscitate a lost Indic world.

Before answering this specific question, perhaps it would have been prudent to engage with the work of prominent theorists in South Asian Studies and Postcolonial Theory that have continuously tackled this very question of nationalism, contestation, and resistance e.g. Frantz Fanon, Partha Chatterjee and Manu Goswami.⁹ For example, in relation to the Sikh nationalist idiom and Mandair’s discussion of hetero-lingual “spaces,” Gowasmi’s work opens multiple theoretical horizons by forcing us to think about the materiality of space itself—asking us to consider how colonialism homogenized socio-spatial relations at the same time it differentiated population groups between race and caste depending on what constituted the form of labor.¹⁰ Thus, Mandair would have had to examine how the ability to enunciate a hetero-lingual address in the present moment is tied to the movement of Capital, which, in turn, is also mediated through colonial ethnographic demarcations and the state’s racial and caste logic. These presences then in our current historical situation force us to examine why,

and how, politics within marginalized communities can be premised on cathartic exclusionary violence that reject a heterolingual address as well as “love for the other” and why such violence is a legitimate non-colonial form of politics.¹¹

A related question that arises when we examine Mandair’s work relates to the hegemonic status assigned to the ontotheological framework. In other words, for which populations is this interpellative gesture made? Who does this ontotheological schema suture and who within this schema is able to resist such closure, if anyone at all? A more serious engagement with Subaltern Studies shifts the optic away from incontrovertible conceptual frameworks of the West that reorder tradition, such as translation, to the continuous struggle of Sikhs in the colony to express their sovereignty outside and within this very structure.¹² Or, as Gavin Flood, asks us to ponder: what happens to the question of agency, which need not be centered on dialogue or concepts such as “religion-making.”¹³ Mandair, in his co-authored introduction with Markus Dressler, “Modernity, Religion-Making, and the Postsecular,” in the edited volume *Secularism and Religion-Making*, briefly touches on agency through this very concept of religion-making. Mandair and Dressler argue, “marginalized sociocultural communities have adopted the language of religion as means of empowerment vis-à-vis assimilationist politics directed against them” and “such religion-making below forms a dialectical relationship with religion-making from above, implicitly accepting the latter’s hegemony to the language and semantics of which it responds.” However, this appropriation does not function as coercion, but rather Mandair and Dressler call on us to examine the “more complex dynamics of agency” for the “translation process has to provide sufficient space for the agency of local appropriation of elements of this discourse.”¹⁴

Yet, though more complex, this conceptualization of agency remains grounded in subverting norms appropriated through religion-making. In contrast, perhaps we could turn to notions of agency that do not demand subversion through appropriation or a point of rupture through recognition in consciousness and critique. Instead, we can consider how each historical moment is saturated by multiple inexplicable excesses including those of the Sikh population. These excesses remind us that the symbolic order and the temporal reordering it achieves is never as stable as it presents itself. For, as Lacan recognizes in his surrealist bending of time, temporality is much more fraught and volatile than Mandair presents, though fantasy renders it otherwise. Such bending of time requires we think about how time, as Jacques Derrida, Achille Mbembe, Talal Asad and others remind us, is “out of joint” in which temporalities continually

converge and intersect, [or simply exist outside the salvific tendencies of secular temporality], creating an assemblage of multiple temporalities that exist as interruptions, disturbances, and disjunctures in which “the symbolic is always in a state of flux.”¹⁵

This conception of time demands we move away from questions that seek to explicate when it is possible for Sikhs to challenge colonial restructuring of their concepts and tradition to what political possibilities are continually effaced by fantasy, but nonetheless present within tradition. Within this project, Sikhism retains its vibrancy and possibility comes to the forefront. We no longer need to locate, or wait for, moments within a singular timeline that return contestations to a prior static Sikhism. We would no longer need to point to a specific breach such as the 1990s that allowed the scholar to then deconstruct textual practices and offer new readings. Instead we are forced to examine how, as Slavoj Žižek argues, “there is never a ‘right moment’ for the revolutionary event, the situation is never ‘mature enough’ for a revolutionary act—the act is always by definition, ‘premature.’”¹⁶ The failure of the nationalist idiom for Sikhs does not mean now time is “mature” for new readings by the critic, but rather we must ask how premature acts were, and are, continuously possible amongst the population prior to a moment of “un-translation.”

To be fair, this point does haunt Mandair’s analysis throughout his book. For example, at one moment, when discussing lack, he writes:

These nonmodern forms of signification survive as an undercurrent in certain strands of Sikh oral exegesis and in the lives of many Sikhs and even manage to occasionally manifest themselves in the certain reappropriations of the political that haunt the modernist/nationalist mindset” (354).

This nonmodern form embedded within the nationalist idiom, though repressed, Mandair argues also holds alternative meanings for politics outside the present symbolic community. He posits:

A closer look at the nationalist idiom shows that far from eradicating the non-modern, the latter simply underwent repression; the nationalist idiom has always carried alternative meanings and terms which are routinely used in language contexts and practices other than the current global-Latinized ones of which English is the currently predominant one.¹⁷

Here Mandair gestures at the very critique of Subaltern Studies. Certain Sikh populations linger outside the conceptual frame of the colonial symbolic order and remain eminently political as possibilities outside the nationalist idiom and, following Partha Chatterjee, within it. Yet, if this is the case, then why is there a need for a new deconstructive approach of un-translation? Why are these manifestations, these hauntings outside the framework of hermeneutics, not serious historical possibilities that can be analyzed as such? Why must the historical imaginative demands of the Sikh populace remain colonized?¹⁸

Though Mandair largely avoids these questions, perhaps we can glean from Mandair's work what these answers could be. For example, the material failure of the nationalist idiom of the early 1990s is not enough to create a rupture, for, as Mandair argues, "in order for this resonance to be accessed, however, it was necessary for textual readings to thoroughly eschew the kind of metaphysics that had been accrued by modernist Sikh understanding" (26-27). Such readings would be similar to Mandair's, for as he argues:

...my own readings of such moves in Singh Sabha theology also, and at the same time, release the non-modern meanings of terms such as *shabad-guru*, *nirgun-sargun* etc.— meanings that had been repressed under the signs of nation and religion.¹⁹

Thus, these hauntings are not serious possibilities because there is no escape from the ontotheological schema until there are new readings that release what he terms the "non-modern" from the prison of metaphysics i.e. a new repetition. This is Mandair's project, for, as he writes, it is his *own* reading that challenges the repression under the sign of the nation and religion that interrupts the enunciation brought forth by Trumpp and signals, conceivably, the birth of a new Singh Sabha movement. Within this logic, poor and downtrodden Sikhs, embedded outside a heterolinguality and yet still representative of the colonial order, require the elite to guide them through the contours of tradition. Orthodoxy remains a top-down approach and a libertory promise of Academia lies at its end.

Perhaps this is why Mandair ignores the practices of the populace and only locates the logic of the ontotheological schema amongst Sikh intellectuals because the elite, within Mandair's work, are the sole arbiters of tradition. Michael Nijhawan points to a similar critique. He posits that Mandair's "argument lacks here where it otherwise excels: in acknowledging the complexities of vernacular narrative and memory in relation to the uniformity of elite identity discourse."²⁰

By ignoring the complexities of the “vernacular,” Mandair’s work is in sharp contrast to work in South Asian History that does not discount these multiple temporal presences. That is to say, we need not reject the importance of *nam simran* in practice amongst the population in favor of its conceptual importance amongst intellectuals. For example, Gyan Prakash focuses on the *kamias*’ preservation, transmission, and performance of oral tradition, a mythic discursive practice, which combated their dominated existence though simultaneously operating within its framework. Though “none of these radically changed the relations of power,” Prakash argues, “that is no reason to conclude these that these challenges were insignificant.”²¹ Accordingly, we then need to question why this lack, the emptiness of the vernacular, emerges in Mandair’s work—how is this lack constitutive of Mandair’s project? We need to interrogate why, once again, the colonized non-elite, the rude elements, are consigned to “the imaginary waiting room of history” [the ontotheological schema] as they wait to learn the art of self-introspection.²²

Moreover, why privilege such a colonial manifestation of tradition that places the demands of orthodoxy onto the intellectual elite? In contrast to privileging the intellectual, we could perhaps take seriously Talal Asad’s conception of orthodoxy, wherein orthodoxy cannot be conceptualized as a rupture moment where one group/idea takes hold, but as a continuous struggle for coherence between “narrator and audience,” between so-called elites and the population.²³ Tradition then constitutes a site for debate about what Sikhism is—that includes multiple arguments embedded with competing notions of time and space that emerge not strictly from new readings and concepts, but from Sikh ethical practices that cultivate dispositions that can continually disrupt the colonial order. For example, we can ask: how is reading itself a set of practices, sensibilities, and disciplines that make representation intelligible beyond semiotics? Following Saba Mahmood, perhaps we can then, as she writes, “attend to the affective and embodied practices through which a subject comes to relate to a particular sign—a relation founded not only on representation but also on what I will call attachment and cohabitation.”²⁴ In the context of Punjab, Farina Mir skillfully points to this very direction revealing how printing of classical Punjabi literary genres did not, as she writes “produce a radical rupture with the performance traditions they were part of” in part because of the “protocols of orality embedded in the printed texts” i.e. certain bodily practices and techniques embedded within the text.²⁵ Thus, by rethinking orthodoxy through Asad and the question of ethical practice, we can see how tradition, as a site of struggle for hegemony that colonial

logic seeks to make static, lays bare the tensions within the form of ideological interpellation—its incompleteness and its possibilities.

I hope this review essay reveals that taking seriously the interactions between colonialism, elite Sikhs, and the population, not situated around humanist conceits such as freedom and dialogue or totalizing modular schemas, but rather teased out by coupling the theoretical with the empirical, can only help us avoid privileging the temporal horizon of colonial modernity.²⁶ It is important to note that though Mandair's focus on the violence of colonial rule at times reduces Sikh contestations and voices, his work also has opened up numerous avenues for scholars to consider possibilities outside the frame of colonial logic that has dominated Sikh Studies. Moreover, projects, like Mandair's, that reflect upon the relationships between colonialism and Sikhism critically through theory are worthwhile endeavors especially when we consider the continued proliferation of vast inequalities and the degradation of life throughout the globe, which requires politics outside the frame of liberal democratic Capitalism.

Yet we need to continually question the place we assign academics within our desire for such emancipatory politics. We must ask ourselves: who are these intellectuals who hold so much weight and prowess where they can inaugurate, reveal, and rupture the colonial symbolic order? Or, to put it another way, can we remain enamored by this imaginary treadmill of history, the colonial symbolic order, and still take seriously those outside our heterolingual gymnasium as historical actors—those who are, for example, illiterate and beneath the weight of our consumption practices? Perhaps, following this line of inquiry, we can consider the limitations of our own treadmills and articulate the continued presence of unnoticed possibilities deemed unimportant historically by highlighting, as Talal Asad argues, "there is not, nor can there be, such a thing as a universally acceptable account of a living tradition" for it is always contestable within its own coordinates and logics.²⁷

Notes

¹ Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 222.

² Adrian Johnston, *Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 43.

³ See Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (New York: Verso, 2008), 43 and Slavoj Žižek, *Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism* (London: Penguin, 2014), 125.

⁴ The literature on modernity as an incomplete project that is staged as a universal is vast. For example, see Timothy Mitchell, "Introduction" in *Questions of Modernity*, ed. Timothy Mitchell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

⁵ See Talal Asad, "The Trouble of Thinking" in David Scott, Charles Hirschkind ed., *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 292.

⁶ I write privileges because Mandair, at points, recognizes the instability of modernity. For example, he argues within the colonial symbolic order, the concept of religion is not stable and that "conversion" into modernity can never be complete.

⁷ For example, Mandair asks: "The question I want to pose in the final part of this chapter is whether it is possible for Sikhs today, first, to recognize this form of repetition as a vicious cycle and, second, to exit this cycle." The earlier part of the book then seeks to explain how Sikhs entered this vicious cycle. See Mandair, *Religion and the Specter of the West*, 356.

⁸ What constitutes an Act is a highly contested question, see: Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, tran. by Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), Edward Pluth, *Signifiers and Acts: Freedom in Lacan's Theory of the Subject* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and *Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), Slavoj Žižek, *Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012).

⁹ It is imperative we consider who takes precedence in the marketplace of references that structure the academy. See the exchange between Saraubh Dube and Arvind-Pal Mandair in Peter Gottschalk and Matthew N. Schmatz ed. *Engaging South Asian Religions: Boundaries, Appropriations, and Resistances* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011).

¹⁰ See Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

¹¹ For a discussion of Mandair's understanding of politics see his discussion of heterogeneity and the politics of love that stem from it, see *Religion and the Specter of the West*, 430.

¹² Yet, as Michael Nijhawan argues: "Mandair's engagement with the subaltern school's critique of nationalist historiography remains somewhat limited, also and does not entail a broader perspective on other vernacular sources." See: Michael Nijhawan "Sikhism, Traumatic Repetition, and the Question of Aesthetic Sovereignty," *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 23, no. 2 (2011): 134.

-
- ¹³ Gavin Flood, "Review of Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, *Religion and the Specter of the West: Sikhism, India, Postcoloniality, and the Politics of Translation*," *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion* 23 (2011): 79-81.
- ¹⁴ Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, eds., *Secularism & Religion-Making*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 22-23.
- ¹⁵ Johnston, *Žižek's Ontology*, 119. Thus, as Johnston explicates, "Despite superficial appearances to the contrary, there is an amazing degree of fragile, unstable volatility to the signifier-mediated subjectification...all signifiers including those elevated to the status of concrete universal organizing states of subjectification unavoidably are caught up in various destabilizing, transformative, diachronic dynamics." (Johnston, 226). Also see Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (London: Routledge, 2006), Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), Prathama Banerjee, *Politics of Time: "Primitives" and History-Writing in a Colonial Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Ruth Mas, "On the Apocalyptic Tones of Islam in Secular Time," in *Secularism and Religion Making*, eds. Arvind-Pal S. Mandair and Markus Dressler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 87-103.
- ¹⁶ Slavoj Žižek, *In Defense of Lost Causes* (New York: Verso, 2008), 390-391.
- ¹⁷ Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, "Uneasy Repetitions: A Response," *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 23, no. 2 (2011): 182.
- ¹⁸ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
- ¹⁹ Mandair, "Uneasy Repetitions," 184.
- ²⁰ Nijhawan, "Sikhism, Traumatic Repetition, and the Question of Aesthetic Sovereignty," 136.
- ²¹ Gyan Prakash, *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 225.
- ²² Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8.
- ²³ Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 210. In this reading, we can account for a multiplicity of Sikh positions without rejecting the unity of the Sikh tradition in contrast to the increasing demands of fluidity.
- ²⁴ Saba Mahmood, "Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide," *Critical Inquiry* 35 (2009): 842.

²⁵ Farina Mir, *Social Space of Language: Vernacular Culture in British Colonial Punjab* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 91-92. Anne Murphy recently has pointed to these possibilities as well. See Anne Murphy, "The Formation of the Ethical Sikh Subject in the Era of British Colonial Reform," *Sikh Formations* 11, no. 1-2 (May 4, 2015): 149-59.

²⁶ I am trying to gesture toward the types of analyses espoused by Ajeet Singh Matharu before his passing as well as projects undertaken by *Naad Pargaas* in Punjab. For Matharu, see Naindeep Singh Chann, "In Remembrance: Ajeet Singh Matharu (1983-2010)" *The Journal of Punjab Studies* 17, no. 1 & 2 (2010): 195-198.

²⁷ Talal Asad, "The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam," Occasional Papers Series (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986), 17.