



Book forum on Charles Hirschkind, *The Feeling of History: Islam, Romanticism, and Andalusia* (Chicago, 2021)

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Introduction

Basit Kareem Iqbal and Candace B. Lukasik

Charles Hirschkind begins his new book, *The Feeling of History: Islam, Romanticism, and Andalusia*, by stating his argument simply: ‘medieval Muslim Iberia did not disappear from history with the seizure of Granada in 1492 by Christian armies, as our history books would have it. Rather, forced into hiding, it continued on as an invisible warp within the fabric of Christian society’ (1). The historiography of modern Spain (and broader Europe) divides and separates Christian from Muslim and Jew, modern Andalusia from medieval al-Andalus, Spanish from Arabic. Even so, a minor tradition called *Andalucismo*, from the nineteenth century through today, continued to feel the heft of the historical ‘fabric’ that ‘binds’ al-Andalus to Andalusia (2). Its exponents work to ‘assemble the shards of sense they find in ancient monuments, in etymologies, in gestures, in names, and in music, drawing these fragments of the past into a lived inheritance’. They ‘cultivate and promote new perceptual habits’ in order to attune their own sensibilities, to be able to see what has become invisible and to hear what has been drowned out. In doing so they reveal the work that goes into producing this historical disjuncture: ‘Andalucismo puts into question the discursive protocols and sensory epistemology that secure these oppositions and that produce the historical closure of al-Andalus and its noncontemporaneity with our time’ (5). Instead siting themselves at the occluded ‘hinge’ of al-Andalus and Andalusia, they engage in a ‘historical therapeutics, a reorientation of cultural and political subjectivity through an excavation of a buried past’ (3).

The material language of textile (of warp, fabric, weave) returns at the end of the book, where Hirschkind describes Andalucismo as ‘diagnos[ing] and occup[ying] a tear in the fabric of Europe, the ontology of Europe’ (158). The invisible warp remains constitutive of Spanish culture but the fabric has been rent, as and where the figure of the Muslim

is expelled and this extrusion structures aspects of European identity. Hirschkind advises us that we might learn something from the Andalucistas, though they have long been accused of elitism, naive multiculturalism, and wild Romanticism. Granting of course the 'risk' of idealization (166n26), Hirschkind nonetheless calls our attention to the 'delicate historical labor' (160) performed by the Andalucistas, that we might follow them at least to 'recognition of a certain recalcitrance of the past to manipulation, the way our lives, in other words, are always already inscribed within a particular articulation of past, present, and future, and that hence, our experience necessarily has a temporal dimension' (158). Across four sites (political geography, history, music, and architecture), they sought to register in their own sensory experience the ongoing inheritance of al-Andalus, albeit one 'more felt than known' (3)

The Feeling of History attends to this moulding of the sensorium in encountering the past, and reconsiders how the past vividly shapes the present. Here the past is not simply what has come before but rather 'a point of our vulnerability where life exceeds our reflective grasp of it' (21). Hirschkind explores how the Andalucistas found themselves interpellated by the past, their relationship to which was 'affectively structured' and demanded a 'unique attunement and response' (23). He thus also challenges historicist approaches to temporality and historiographical emphases on human agency, neither of which equip us to perceive the unique sensibility of the Andalucistas' historical experience.

Hirschkind focuses on the crafting of a 'lifeworld' (3) which is passionately attached to the past, not simply its political instrumentalization (21). Indeed, Andalucismo accommodated varying political commitments (Spanish fascism and anti-fascism, both); for 'what unites thinkers within this tradition is not a political prescription but the sense of a shared Andalusian historical legacy as the ground from which the present must be encountered, interrogated, and lived' (5). Much as in his earlier ethnography, *The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics* (2006), explicit institutional or party politics are here displaced for an attention to different reorientations of political and cultural subjectivity. The tradition of Andalucismo is, therefore, less focused on a subject than on the sensibilities cultivated through it (albeit sensibilities which can only be read through their biographical careers). Andalucistas traversed multiple registers of sensory practice and aesthetic experience as a means to open up al-Andalus onto the present – and further, as a means to think differently about contemporary Spain and Europe and their relation to Islam and the Middle East (5).

As Hirschkind points out, Andalucismo has not received the critical engagement it deserves because of its perceived historical naivete ('nostalgia!') and its perceived political instrumentalization ('the invention of tradition!'). Instead, he reads it as a 'modern tradition of critical reflection' (3), which opens horizons of thought beyond the entrenched polarities of contemporary existence (158). Its historiographic moods of awe and melancholy, and its emphasis on experience, bespeak its Romantic pedigree, in which the imagination is a 'honed faculty, intermediary between the sensible and the intelligible and mediating between them' (18); but it is not a Romantic nationalism. Rather it unsettles existing identity formations (6), and thinks others anew. And although not simply a Foucauldian counter-history (158), it is founded in recognition of a historical loss: 'Andalucismo – a tradition founded on a diagnosis of

an injury – an amputation of memory – in the historical ontology of Spain and Europe’ (160).

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The following reflections on *The Feeling of History* attend to these broader themes. Rajbir Singh Judge focuses on Hirschkind’s ‘ethnography of historiography’, noting that ‘the past then is not a matter of truth, but oriented toward the ethical work it does in the present’. Judge observes that, following Hirschkind, archival methods are insufficient to think through the ‘felt relations’ of Andalucismo. ‘These relations require that one go beyond thinking about the past of al-Andalus – typical for a historian – and instead consider “passionately encountering that past” rather than discovering it’ (102). Or, as Hirschkind writes, discovering *oneself* inheriting a certain past.

Hussein Fancy focuses on the concept of *convivencia* (much-debated around Andalucismo) as famously articulated by the philologist and literary scholar Américo Castro. Although many have read him to valorize the Andalusian past, Fancy writes that Castro himself had a ‘rather bleak’ view of intercommunal relations in medieval Iberia. Instead, he locates Castro’s arguments in the mid-twentieth century ‘intellectual derangements across Europe’, arguing finally that *convivencia* is ultimately philosophical rather than historical. He critiques the ongoing divisions of Spanish historiography, likening them to a ‘butchering’, a severing of the past from the present, with (ongoing) violent consequences.

Patrick Eisenlohr takes a different approach, focusing instead on the link between aesthetics and politics. He notes that Hirschkind’s argument could be taken up by divergent political programmes of fascists and right-wing nationalists. ‘What do we make of the fact that even shared feelings such as those provoked through common sonorous grounds are subject to divergent qualifications, leading in rather different political and ethical directions?’ Eisenlohr asks.

Martin Stokes draws out some of the implications of Hirschkind’s attention to music as one site of ‘the sense of history’. He wonders about the employment of spatial metaphors (territory, historical geography) in an argument about music and temporality; about the attention to what music ‘affords’ historical sensibilities expressed through discourse; and about musicological or other approaches to ‘performance’.

Finally, Stefania Pandolfo offers a reading that begins and ends with the Andalucista Angel Ganivét’s short story ‘The Ruins of Granada’, a baroque fiction contrasting two radically different experiences of ruination and two incommensurable modes of relating to the past. She underscores the book’s status as a reflection on traumatic memory and an historical wound, although it does not take up the familiar lexicon of trauma and reparation.

We thank each of these readers for their remarkable reflections on *The Feeling of History*, and Charles Hirschkind for his response.

On the prejudices of historians¹

Rajbir Singh Judge

‘Do all pasts’, Charles Hirschkind asks, ‘demand the same dispassionate attitude from us? Is there a singular affective tone appropriate to the heterogeneous pasts to which we find

ourselves attached and by which they can be authoritatively disclosed?’ (18). In his evocative *The Feeling of History*, Hirschkind explores these important questions by considering *andalucismo*, which he defines as ‘a modern tradition of critical reflection on the norms of European politics and culture based on a cultivated appreciation for the histories and legacies of southern Iberia’s Muslim and Jewish societies’ (3). Hirschkind turns to a diverse array of *andalucistas* to understand how they inhabit this complex inheritance. We learn that *andalucistas* provide a ‘historical therapeutics’ that is not tied to the recovery of knowledge through a detached intellectual exercise or analytical gaze, but a tradition anchored in sensibilities and felt relations that traverse peoples and practices (5). It is, therefore, Hirschkind insists, a tradition that refuses the epistemological conceits of professional history by attuning to sensory experiences, the passions, notably sound.

Historians themselves have critiqued the detached and dispassionate distance History avers as a discipline that leads to an interring of the past (De Certeau 1988; Chakrabarty 2001; El Shakry 2021). In South Asian Studies, this critique has been especially vigorous and mirrors, in many ways, Hirschkind’s analysis. For example, scholars have challenged such historicist cravings and discovered lost connections, alternative imaginaries, or, to borrow from Hirschkind, ‘geohistorical possibilities’ attuned to an affective relation to space – one that is, let’s say, tied to region. One need only glance at voluminous literature on the Indian Ocean, which, though difficult to impute a singular purpose onto, demonstrates how connectivity and porosity challenge the integrated histories of modern nation-states. The Indian Ocean, after all, is not ‘likely to be dominated by the political states or nations that have come to occupy center stage in the writing of most modern histories’ as Edward Alpers reminds us (2014, 5). The Indian Ocean then is more than simply an object of historical inquiry since it also offers another vision of the world that challenges the prescription of ‘North Atlantic universals’ such as the nation (Trouillot 2003, 35; Ghosh 1993; Hofmeyer 2012). In changing the enunciation of these universals, alternate pasts and regions linger though other historians still seek to adjudicate them in modern historical form by fragmenting their unity. The concept and place of Hindustan is one example that Manan Ahmed Asif has ably deliberated upon. He teaches us how India was carved territorially and historically within a colonial episteme, which erased the ‘pre-colonial geography of the subcontinent’ known as Hindustan. Thinking about this alternate imaginary today can become a site where perhaps ‘new ethical registers can be opened up’, rather than a project of recovery through colonial ways of knowing (Asif 2020, 101).

Such heterogeneous pasts and alternate sites, we learn, provide resources – even correctives – to the politics of virulent nationalism that become tied to religion. In India, Sumit Sarkar tells us, ‘a genealogy of Hindu communalism’ requires we consider the transition

from an inchoate ‘Hindu’ world without firmly defined boundaries to the late-nineteenth-century constructions, in the context of more integrative colonial communication structures, of ideologies of unified ‘Hinduism’; and then a further move in some quarters, roughly dateable to the mid 1920s, towards aggressive Hindutva postulated usually upon an enemy image of a similarly conceived Islam. (1998, 363)

In fact, it is only with the exclusion of Islam in both Spain and India that the nations gain a coherence (Hirschkind 12; Anidjar 2007).² And it is to challenge these hardened bounded

regions, such as Europe and India, that scholars as well as activists, artists, and musicians point toward alternative traditions and pasts with a plural inheritance or, in Hirschkind's context, a 'plurireligious culture' (57).

Yet the reach of these traditions into the academy is limited. As David Stenner notes, 'contemporary scholarship on this cultural intersection is blurred and unfocused, creating absences where there should be narratives of connections spanning eras and genres' (2019, 7). One hears a similar refrain from Hirschkind. These alternative accounts are especially limited in history because the charge of Romanticism or Orientalism looms large. For Hirschkind, this is because history values the 'ontology of flux' that removes stability and continuity within a tradition like *andalucismo* (76). Stability and continuity become 'motivated fictions of a political strategy' (76). In proclaiming continuity as a fiction, historians remove the past as a reference to model one's life thereby disqualifying a range of arguments and claims. Attachments become an anathema as the historian searches for contingencies that shatter givens that preclude a 'deeper exploration into the claims of *Andalucismo*: in this case, its unique political vision of a resurgent Mediterranean society' (170 fn. 3). Historians thus demonstrate, to borrow from David Scott, 'the epistemological naïveté' of attachments that *andalucistas* cultivate (9).

This became clear in some of the reception to Asif's book, to return to the example of Hindustan. As Asif writes, 'The erasure of the precolonial idea of Hindustan has meant that it is taken as a truism that there was no coherent concept of peninsular India before British domination' (3). Yet to locate this concept of Hindustan in what is a fragmented historical terrain is to find an essence or to make a historical question a matter of nostalgia. Foregrounding Hindustan as a concept can reproduce a classic Orientalist notion of the subcontinent: that there is a singular underlying essence to a place. This is probably why Asif's book troubled multiple historians who, in their reviews, called for the mapping of multiple temporalities to further fragment Hindustan. One historian asks, how does the Indian Ocean imaginaries and their fluidity disrupt Hindustan? It is by further fragmenting Hindustan, that historical redemption can be reached. As Dilip Menon writes in his review, 'the loss of longing may well be the beginning of historical wisdom' (Menon 2021).

By focusing narrowly from an epistemological viewpoint, the charges of Orientalism and Romanticism obscure how *andalucistas* as well as Hindustanis are grappling with an inheritance in a direct, unmediated relation to the present (146). But historians still comfortably proclaim they focus on actual events in the past, what Ethan Kleinberg calls ontological realism, while deriding the false representations *andalucistas* (or Hindustanis) provide in naming their society (1). In so doing, what is spectral is made into a 'fixed and permanent object' (3). Is it possible, however, to read moments of attunement to an alternate tradition as more than simply a flight of fancy or machinations of Orientalism? This is no easy task, as Hirschkind reminds us. Still, Hirschkind contends, *andalucismo* is not assigning an essence to a place, but is 'an attempt to find (better, to feel) one's way in a space of dislocation and confusion, as space of modern life marked by its constitutive expulsions and violence' (31). Moreover, *andalucistas* and their passion for al-Andalus is not exhausted in subjective feeling, according to Hirschkind; it is an ethical project. It gives 'impetus to a process of self-transformation and critical reason' (31). Hirschkind admits this is a difficult task; he acknowledges *andalucistas* 'walk along a thin edge, trucking in the Oriental while trying to avoid succumbing to its sterile fantasies' (32).

It is this focus on this process of self-transformation and critical reason that leads Hirschkind away from recuperating medieval al-Andalus and also sharply differentiates *The Feeling of History* from the historical work in *South Asian Studies* (159). Recovery would presume a temporal distance and create a 'competing narrative' or alternative history within the same epistemological constraints of history (158). It would be to discover a different content that can reinscribe the very conceits of history and its attendant temporality. It can be helpful to recall how modernity is not simply a particular content in time, but, as Peter Osborne writes, 'an abstract temporal structure which, in totalizing history from the standpoint of an ever-vanishing, ever-present present, embraces a conflicting plurality of projects, of possible futures, provided they conform to its basic logical structure' (2018, 23). To be a legitimate historian, one has to discipline the past to this structure. In an important antidote to such projects of recovery, Hirschkind foregrounds the sensibilities that are procured in a relation to the past rather than the past itself. The past then is not a matter of truth, but oriented toward the ethical work it does in the present. 'My argument is that *andalucismo* deserves our attention not only for the way it brings to light a past left in the darkness but because the horizons of thought and life it opens may be crucial to the task of finding our way beyond stubborn polarities that continue to threaten our collective existence,' is Hirschkind's conclusion (159).

Hirschkind bypasses the impositions of history by offering an ethnography of historiography. In so doing, historiography is torn apart. Historiographical arguments that are presumed to be overcome by a fine-tuning of historical understanding return as critical sensibilities rather than as knowledge. Ways of belonging that are excluded from the history take centre-stage as historiographical arguments warp in the methodological shift Hirschkind enacts. That is, Hirschkind is not merely historicizing history and, therefore, historicizing historians. Instead, he challenges the archival methods crucial to history by chafing against the very methods that secure the past by asking us to focus on the 'felt relations' to *andalucismo*. These relations require that one go beyond thinking about the past of Al-Andalus – typical for a historian – and instead consider 'passionately encountering that past' rather than discovering it (102).

Music and sound are crucial here. Flamenco, for example, 'creates the ground for a pas-sional relation to the past that allows it to be thought and lived otherwise' (104). Hirschkind contends this ground creates projects such as 'recuperating and performing medieval traditions of Arabo-Andalusi music' (104). A historical view of these performances, however, emphasizes the construction of flamenco as heritage in the project of cultural nationalism or the emergence of the 'world music' industry in producing tastes and desires for flamenco (104). Hirschkind, in contrast, allows ethnography to deconstruct the positions given by the historians. Approaching ethnographically, put differently, allows one to consider the senses in the encounter with the past and reveals music as a 'trans-gressive historical space' (104). It allows us to ask 'How can we account for the missing portions of the past without simply assuming them to be the missing part of a larger whole whose properties and scope we have already determined?' (Kleinberg 2017, 10). We then learn how scholars and musicians have attuned their ear to properly hear a 'sensory memory', which provides a 'sensory foundation' for historical reflection that exceeds the terms set forth by historical context (110).

Yet Hirschkind is not upholding anti-essentialism (crucial to critiques of Orientalism) as any sort of corrective. Hirschkind argues one cannot simply fragment the tradition by

revealing its invention – the invention of *andalucismo* as tradition – rather one has to inhabit its givenness.³ *Andalucismo* is one such given form of life with an attendant embodiment. It requires learning; one must learn the ‘patterns of felt connections between music and other practices’ as well as ‘listening practices the tradition promotes’ (126). In *andalucismo*, therefore, what we find is not necessarily a prescriptive way for critique to proceed, but a tradition that unsettles the questions and answers as the past remains recalcitrant to a given order of things. The past is not abstracted away in a distance; rather the past inhabits *andalucistas*, deforming the ‘horizon of our thinking’ (158).

Though it is a given form of life, *andalucismo* does not have a clearly defined essence; it is rather a space of improvisation (126). There is a restlessness Hirschkind encounters in *andalucistas*, who are governed by an ‘ethics of disorientation’ (55). *Andalucismo* ‘exerts friction on’ and ‘chafes against’ national identities (39). In this unsettling, the past is not jettisoned. Rather, as Aimé Césaire insisted in relation to time, ‘we are not men for whom it is a question of “either-or”’ (1955, 51). And because of this refusal to abide within a singular logic, *andalucismo* does not provide an easy political answer; there is not a singular politics promoted in the sensibilities provided by *andalucistas*. To quote Hirschkind in full:

Andalucismo is most valuable in my view in the way it unsettles political and geographic certainties rather than in what it prescribes. Instead of providing a normative political compass, *Andalucismo* offers a remapping of possibilities (conceptual, geographic, aesthetic, political, ethical), each entailing its own new set of liabilities, risks, dangers, and blind spots. (39–40)

These risks have manifested across time as *andalucismo* has shored up both Spanish colonialism and fascism. Flamenco is one example. It has ‘often been incorporated within such nationalist discourse, and indeed, many practices of Andalusian origin (e.g. bullfighting) have come to stand as figures of Spanish identity’ (127). The problem is there are now options that foreclose possibilities in modernity by reorienting the possibilities for givenness. ‘The very desire for roots’, as Paul Stasi has it, ‘is due to the omnipresence of routes, which detach both subject and object from contextual structures within which they originally gained their significance’ (2012, 19). Yet to historicize *Andalucismo* as one route amongst many would be to refuse to examine how *andalucismo* unsettles and cultivates the ground in which roots themselves branch out in multiple directions, adaptive to the changing environment while remaining a singular tradition.

Although undoing normative political commitments, a demand to be ‘restless’, ‘exert friction’, to ‘deform’, can also restrict attachments especially when these prescriptions are tied to a worldly identity. In centring such ‘geohistorical possibilities’ and a ‘remapping’, region takes precedence and becomes the ground from which Islam gains meaning. ‘Geo’, recall, is tied to the earth, an immanent ordering. It is this immanence that becomes the ground from which judgment emerges – a condition which can police attachments to Islam. We can see how *andalucismo* regulates Islam in this manner in the brief mention of Aziz Balouch, the young singer from Pakistan who engaged seriously with flamenco. For Hirschkind, this is a fluid geographic relationship. He writes:

Moreover, this musical geography of *Andalucismo* is not limited to the Mediterranean. A particularly interesting account of discovering a shared aesthetic vocabulary linking in flamenco to traditions of South Asian Islam is the case of Aziz Balouch. In the early 1930s Balouch

traveled from his home in the province of Sindh to Spain for reasons of study. When his friends subsequently introduced him to some flamenco records, he was struck by its similarities to Sufi music he knew from Sindh. (112)

To Hirschkind, Balouch was able to hear family resemblances between the geographically distant musical styles by tying them into medieval trade between al-Andalus, Damascus, and Sindh (112). Here the past is something sounded out rather than empirically discovered.⁴ It is therefore an improvisational space, making connections possible. It is 'simultaneously musical and historical – an articulation of sound and of time forged not with the resources of narrative but by rhythm, timbre, scale, and tone' (103).

Even with all the qualifications Hirschkind provides, perhaps there is more to a critique of anti-essentialism than simply locating a more capacious geographic or even sonic space. To expand, for Scott, we need to consider the specificity of questions that post-colonial answers tried to provide. We have to attend to, in other words, the problem-spaces – 'conceptual-ideological ensembles, discursive formations, or language games that are generative of objects and therefore of questions' – that generate questions and answers (Scott 1999, 8). What would it mean to consider the problem-space when asking about *andalucismo*? This would entail exploring how the division between region and religion becomes marked in the liquefaction of Christianity as Hirschkind does, but also how the denial of these divisions might follow from those very same questions. We might have to ask: 'What practical options are opened up or closed by the notion that the world has no significant binary features, that it is, on the contrary, divided into overlapping, fragmented cultures, hybrid selves, continuously dissolving and emerging social states?' (Asad 2003, 15). This is important because, Asad continues, the way these binary divisions are both 'established and subverted tells us how people live in the secular' (2003, 15–16). This is, for Asad, a vindication of the sovereign (and, in modernity, immanent) self.

In its subversion, then, *andalucismo* might remain a worldly project. To give one example, I wonder what is the ground that renders Balouch's Islam a South Asian one? Or even a Hindustani one? It seems region and the earthly tones produced across a sonic territory are crucial to understanding Islam, rather than vice versa. Hirschkind tells us this is an aspect of *andalucismo*. It is a cartographic exercise that is warranted (40). Andalucistas, such as Gil Benumeya, produce 'a new historical cartography' or 'a seemingly endless succession of new cartographies' (44, 55). The sociability of music Hirschkind explores 'describes a cartography of association and belonging, of ways of fitting heterogeneous things together in a single organized space' (113). The cartography of Europe becomes entwined with 'Arabo-Islamic aesthetics and constitutively bound to the other side of the Mediterranean' (119). Or, when examining Granada, Hirschkind notes, 'The poetic cartography of Granada embraced the Middle East' (141). Andalucistas are always making and unmaking territory. Yet in upholding this immanence – this cartography – can we still begin 'as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith' (as Asad writes: 1986, 14)?

It seems to me that *andalucismo* and other alternative imaginaries confine possible beginnings to an immanent location, which can subsequently be overcome by another regional organization. There is in *andalucismo*, perhaps, a *regionalization* of God much as there was a humanization of God and natural religion during the Enlightenment.⁵

How do we rethink these worldly demands? Maybe the region is nonessential since the ontological reality of *andalucismo* must be placed in question. This would not mean further expanding the cartographic reach or the restlessness of *andalucismo*, but centring the limits of such projects and their immanent location. To follow Mohamed Amer Meziane's critique, 'for us to liberate ourselves on earth, the earth must be liberated from the burden of carrying our desires of heaven' (2020, 220). Against the immanentizing movement central to *andalucismo* (and the secular), we must instead encircle a placelessness. This placelessness, the Elsewhere, is central to the classical history of Islam; to the Quran and hadith. Amira Mittermaier, for example, asks that we turn our attention to that very Elsewhere in considering dreams (Mittermaier 2012; El Shakry 2017).⁶ This can be 'the space of the *barzakh* – a liminal zone or an isthmus' which was, Omnia El Shakry writes, 'conceptualized by the medieval mystic Ibn 'Arabi (1165–1240) as a space between the existent and the nonexistent, the known and the unknown', rather than another cartography of this world (2020, 172; Pandolfo 2018).⁷ It is a place of non-belonging, a cut, that cannot be settled, created, or confined to the world, to regions.

Hirschkind's book and the historical reevaluations we see in South Asian Studies are good places to begin such an endeavour, however. This is especially so since the first task to undo the past from the binds of history must be, as Edouard Glissant writes, 'to break through the dead tissue that colonial ideology had deposited along their borders' (1989, 62). Hirschkind has brilliantly unordered the intelligibility historians cultivate that denies the possibility to think otherwise with the past. It tears into the very fabric of historicity as sensibilities return to the fore. Yet the past that is released is an unruly visitor, one that eludes even our bodily habituation and, therefore, one that cannot be re-mapped at all, remaining placeless.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Zunaira Komal and Muneeza Rizvi for comments and suggestions on earlier iterations of this essay.
2. More broadly, as Ruth Marshall writes, 'religion comes to be designated, along with its cognates and disseminations, as the violence that must be eliminated from the political field insofar as the hallmark of liberal thought is the evacuation of conflict and violence from the political and its replacement by the (Christian) values of tolerance, agreement, deliberation, communication, and consensus' (2014, 350).
3. David Scott, too, has pursued this line of questioning, asking scholars to consider how those who take an anti-essentialist position remain 'unable to suppress their own desire for mastery, for certainty, for the command of an essential meaning'. In other words, the anti-essentialists produce essential meaning while also generating 'a counter-claim to the *right* way for criticism to carry on' (4).
4. I am grateful to Zunaira Komal for this formulation.
5. For his re-reading of Romanticism and Enlightenment, see Hirschkind 17.
6. Hirschkind refuses the dream for a faculty. He writes: 'The Romantic imagination is not a vehicle of the Unreal (the dream, the hallucination) but, as Larmore's work attests, ought to be understood primarily as a honed faculty, intermediary between the sensible and the intelligible and mediating between them' (18).
7. El Shakry continues: 'Separating the living and the dead, death and resurrection, the corporeal and the spiritual, the *barzakh* is the domain of the imagination and the imaginal world' (172). Here the dream, alongside the bodily, is also crucial (172).

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Convivencia and crisis

Hussein Fancy

One can almost feel the historians bristle. Charles Hirschkind has waded into the thickets of Spanish historiography in order to recuperate a counter-tradition, *Andalucismo*, a form of writing, singing, and dancing about Spain's Jewish and Islamic past. Tracing a line of Romantic anti-modernism from Ángel Ganivet to Emilio González Ferrín, Hirschkind sees not only political pitfalls but also ethical potential. *Andalucismo*, he argues, both testifies to and affirms a shared Mediterranean heritage. It holds the promise of binding a genuinely secular and inclusive future. As such, he aims to speak for this tradition against the arbiters of public memory – modern historians – who have dismissed *Andalucismo* as Orientalist fantasy, lyrical nonsense, and Fascist conspiracy. Like skilled butchers, historians have cut history at the joints, severing its Jewish and Muslim past. Wittingly or unwittingly, he says, they work like inquisitors or border patrolmen, protecting a Catholic Spain. So, it's no surprise that historians have bristled at the portrait. Far from suppressors, they see themselves as suppressed, surrounded by opponents of science, reason, and truth. Is *Andalucismo* the nonsense that they fear? And what would it mean for both this tradition and historicism if it were?

To carve a path through these thickets, it bears considering the remarkable but misunderstood philologist and literary scholar Américo Castro (1885–1972), whom Hirschkind invokes but never examines in detail. Living in exile after the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), Castro wrote *España en su historia*, a volume that he amplified and revised several times under the title of *La realidad histórica de España*.⁸ In this work, he offered a provocative reading of the Spanish past in the light of contemporary crisis. Put simply, rather than a biological race, he argued that Spanish people were the product of what he called *convivencia*, coexistence with Muslims and Jews between the eighth and sixteenth centuries. The inability of the Spanish people to come to terms with this fact, he argued, had put them at odds with their own history.

While many have understood Castro's *convivencia* as a valorization of Spain's Jewish and Islamic past, he meant something decidedly different. For his part, Castro held a rather bleak view of relations in medieval Iberia: 'Each of the three peoples of the Peninsula (Christians, Moors, and Jews) saw itself forced to live for eight centuries with the other two at the same time as it passionately desired their extermination.'⁹ And while it is true that he does speak of 'Islamic tolerance', it is worth lingering on his logic. Castro argued that Islamic tolerance had two principal causes: the pragmatism of ruling elites and the predominance of Sufism. Together, these forces combined to make Spanish Muslims indifferent to dogma.¹⁰ As may be obvious, he meant this not as praise but rather criticism of Islam. For Castro, Islam was a 'totalitarianism of belief'.¹¹ He condemned its theocratic impulse and martial fervour.¹² Imbued with messianism – an irrational and all-consuming belief in the supernatural – he took Islam to be a 'Semitic form of life', alien to the Iberian Peninsula.¹³ In Sufism, however, he saw a countercurrent in the Islamic tradition, one that had its origins in Neo-Platonism and Hellenism, in Athens, not Mecca or Jerusalem.¹⁴ By Castro's convoluted account, Spanish Muslims were tolerant despite Islam, not because of it.

So, what then did Castro mean by *convivencia*? In fact, he derived the term not from history but from his engagement with existentialism and phenomenology.¹⁵ Following the events of World War I, which shook liberal confidence in reason to its core and provoked what Georg Simmel called a 'crisis of culture', a number of Spanish intellectuals turned to critiques of neo-Kantianism emerging from Germany, above all, the works of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger. For these existentialists and phenomenologists, the mind and the world, reason and feeling, could not be held apart. In enigmatic terms like Dilthey's *Erlebnis*, Husserl's *Lebenswelt*, and Heidegger's *Dasein*, they hoped to bridge the gap between subjective and objective experience, between individual and social consciousness. They hoped to supersede the limits of both historicism and Romanticism. With his own neologism, *convivencia*, which might best be translated as 'being with', Castro was not interested in describing the relations between Jews, Christians, and Muslims. He was not interested in valorizing Spain's Jewish and Islamic legacy. He was interested in explaining how the Spanish people came to be at all.

In medieval Iberia, *convivencia* happened to involve Jews, Christians, and Muslims, three distinct peoples or 'castes', as Castro called them. Despite the common understanding of *convivencia*, Castro did not argue that the Spanish people were the merger, admixture, or synthesis of these three people. Instead, he argued that the Hispano-Christian people were suddenly and spontaneously defined and created *against* Muslims and Jews. Castro contended that Islam first imposed itself on Spanish identity by means of its military and cultural superiority. This overwhelming imposition resulted in a cataclysmic rupture.¹⁶ In an effort to defend themselves, the Spanish unconsciously imitated or mirrored the Semitic way of life, which was irrational, violent, and passionate.¹⁷ Still, if these alien forms took root in the Spanish people, Castro insisted that they flowered in a distinctly Spanish way.¹⁸ Tellingly, he invoked Oswald Spengler's notion of *pseudomorphosis* to describe this process of sudden transposition.¹⁹ In Castro's account, the Spanish people bear the imprint of their coexistence with Muslims and Jews, but they were not Muslims or Jews.²⁰ This was not a story of 'cultural crossing'.²¹ They owed no debt to these people, past or present. But if this Spanish form of life made sense in the context of coexistence with Jews and Muslims, then that context that had disappeared after the seventeenth century. After that moment, the Spanish were forced to live in conflict with themselves, a condition that Castro referred to as *desvivirse*. Castro offered no answer for this problem. The contemporary Spanish condition was less a failure to recognize the past than an inescapable tragedy. In the present, the Spanish people could neither go forward nor backward.

In his account of Spain's Jewish and Islamic past, despite consciously breaking with his conservative and liberal predecessors, Castro shared much in common with them. In the spirit of Romantic nationalists like Francisco Javier Simonet (1829–1897), Miguel Asín Palacios (1871–1944), and Ignacio Olagüe (1903–1974), Castro dissolved and domesticated Islam's difference, casting al-Andalus as something uniquely and essentially Spanish. In the spirit of liberal positivists and Arabists like José Antonio Conde (1766–1820), Pascual de Gayangos (1809–1897), and Francisco Codera (1836–1917), Castro spoke of Islamic tolerance and cultural flourishing not as praise of Islam but rather as a criticism of religion as fundamentally irrational. If a 'secular thread' (135) runs through all these traditions, it can only bind Islam to Spain by severing it, cutting religion away from culture, passion from reason, and Jerusalem from Athens. This secular logic persists in the work of

the contemporary scholar Emilio González Ferrín, who carries on Castro's legacy. In *When We Were Arabs*, González Ferrín explains that it is not Islam as a religion or Islam as a society of people but rather Islam as a civilization, an 'Occidental Islam', that belongs to al-Andalus.²² What does it mean that the ecumenical frame of *Andalucismo* patrols these borders?

If Castro's *convivencia* cannot lead to an inclusive future, then it may still point us out of this historiographical thicket. It explains why we keep stumbling into pitfalls. Castro's ideas truly belonged to the intellectual derangements across Europe in the middle of the twentieth century, the so-called political-theological debates that involved some of the greatest philosophical minds in Europe. The famous debate between Rudolph Carnap and Martin Heidegger provides a salient example of the crisis that gripped European thinkers after World War I.²³ Through an appeal to rigorous logic, Carnap set out to demonstrate that Heidegger's dictum, 'the nothing itself nothings (*das Nichts selbst nichtet*)', was dangerous nonsense, an invitation to unreason. The debate appeared to fall along political fault lines: a left-leaning Jewish thinker, devoted to science and reason, squared off against a philosopher, devoted to metaphysics, who would soon join the Nazi party. Nevertheless, the controversy has divided philosophers since because the participants were not really speaking the same language. While Carnap held that 'everything' can be described by science, Heidegger did not disagree. He was not in fact suggesting that there were metaphysical or transcendent truths.²⁴ By speaking of 'nothing', he hoped to describe what lay beyond the world of rules, facts, and names. In one moment, a term like 'Spain' seems simple to define, and in the next, it dissolves as though we've played the game of repeating a word over and over. What interested Heidegger – and indeed, Castro – was how nothing comes to mean something.²⁵ In other words, *convivencia* was about nonsense.

Peter Eli Gordon has suggested that rather than dismissing these debates as allegories of war, which only keeps them at a distance, they should be seen as fundamentally philosophical.²⁶ These debates were reprisals of the tensions within the Enlightenment – which is to say, the tension between religion and reason, passions and interests – but more fundamentally, they reflected the tension between subjectivity and objectivity, between relativism and universalism. This remains the essential debate of modern philosophy and, for Gordon, to recognize it as such means also to recognize that it is insoluble. Relativism itself amounts to a universal and transcendental claim: if historians claim that all meaning derives from context, then they have also generalized that claim across all contexts, as something universally true.²⁷ The knot is self-defeating relativism. For Gordon, this insolubility is an essential and inescapable feature of the post-Kantian intellectual tradition. It is a battle that cannot be won.

If *convivencia* is fundamentally philosophical rather than historical, then what would it mean to move beyond it? If we accept the insolubility of the problem, as Gordon does, then we might proceed with humility. If we cannot close the gap between individual and community, between subjectivity and objectivity, between passion and reason, as Castro tried, then we cannot ultimately choose between historicism and Romanticism, between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. We must reject any attempt to solve the problem, to derive an overarching theory. In a response to Gordon, however, David Nirenberg has argued that there is a danger in de-historicizing and thus, de-politicizing philosophy. In doing so, we exculpate the history of ideas.²⁸ For Nirenberg, the fact

that the nineteenth – and twentieth-century debates about relativism and universalism were shot through with anti-Semitism reveals a deeper and darker history of philosophy. Indeed, in the historiography on medieval Iberia, the contest between subjective and objective truth was cast as a struggle against Judaism and Islam. Over and over, with near automaticity, the opposition was cast as one between the letter and the spirit or between Jerusalem and Athens.²⁹ This habit of thought, which cuts like a butcher, setting one ideal against another, tearing past from present, had and continues to have violent consequences. And the urgent question becomes not whether to choose but why we insist on dividing, why we insist on cutting an undifferentiated world into parts in the first place.

Notes

8. Castro (1948). A translation of this work, which included some revisions, appeared under the title, *The Structure of Spanish History*, Castro (1954b). Castro thoroughly revised *España en su historia* and published it under a new title in 1954, which he subsequently revised four more times: Castro (1954a). A translation, based on the third edition, appeared under the title, *The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History*, Castro (1971). All references to *La realidad* are to the fourth edition unless otherwise stated.
9. Castro (1954b, 54–55, 1954a, 1st ed., 63).
10. Castro (1948, 207, 1954a, 220, 1954b, 221–222). See also Castro (1948, 330, 1954b, 351).
11. Castro (1954a, 1st ed., 226 [dropped in later editions]); cit. Castro (1954b, 229): ‘Moslem tolerance toward other religions was due chiefly to political motives [*índole política*]. At the same time, what I call totalitarianism of belief [*totalitarismo de la creencia*] (the absence of distinction between the religious and the secular) eventually forced the Moors and Jews to be fanatically intolerant. The Spaniards, molded in their structure by the historical impulse of three beliefs, were tolerant because of the exigencies of politics, and intolerant because of the totalitarian, omnipresent character of their belief.’ See also Castro (1971, 499–500).
12. Castro (1948, 192–193, 1954a, 421).
13. Castro (1948, 104, 1954a, 244). See also, Castro (1948, 589, 1954b, 593).
14. Castro (1948, 590, 1954b, 594).
15. Castro (1954a, 141, n. 4).
16. Castro (1954b, 35). See also Castro (1948, 61) as well as Castro (1948, 104, 1954a, 134, 1954b, 127).
17. Castro (1948, 105, 1954a, 134, 1954b, 128):

The Saracens imposed themselves on and opposed themselves to the Christians. The Christians imitated the enemy and at the same time defended themselves using the same approach to life which the Moors has imposed on them, that is, from within a ‘belief,’ a belief in extra-rational power.
18. See also, Castro (1954a, 246, 1st ed., 576, 1st ed., 614, Castro 1971, 293, Castro 1954b, 603, 644).
19. Castro (1948, 65). Cf. Spenger (1937, II: 189).
20. Castro (1954a, 1st ed., 575; Castro, 1954b, 602): ‘It would be a gross error to approach the similarity between the Semitic and the Spanish conceptions of truth as if this similarity represented a transfer of ideas from one people to another like.’
21. Castro (1954a, 1st ed., 598, Castro, 1954a, 618): ‘This sort of thing is often called cultural crossing, but it would be better to understand the creation of Hispanic values as the result of the conflict between opposing tendencies.’
22. Ferrín (2017, 54): ‘[H]ay un islam religioso; un sistema creado por simbiosis en su entorno, por narración retrospectiva, al igual que cualquier otra religión. Lo describiría, mucho después, en mi libro *La angustia de Abraham*. Luego hay otro Islam social, el conjunto de musulmanes en la actualidad. Finalmente hay un tercer Islam: la civilización, heredera de Roma, que puso en

conexión a todo el Mediterráneo y Asia Central, y que con el tiempo sentó gran parte de las bases del Renacimiento europeo. Y en ese tramo final, ese Islam occidental se llamó Alándalus. Esos tres islames, empezando desde el final (Islam civilización, Islam sociedad, islam religión) son sinónimos en árabe, pero no son lo mismo. Entiendo que es éste un punto de partida esencial para comprender tanto el Islam como el mundo.' See also *Cuando fuimos árabes*, 9, 29, 62, and 111 for further explanations of this perspective. See also, Fancy (2019) for a fuller appraisal of this figure.

23. Carnap (1932): [translated as Carnap (1959)], responding to Heidegger (1929) [translated as Heidegger (1999)].
24. Heidegger (1999, 106–107).
25. Heidegger (1999, 110): 'Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?'
26. Gordon (2004).
27. Gordon (2004, 222–223).
28. Nirenberg (2011), *The New Republic* (February 3, 2011). <https://newrepublic.com/article/81380/heidegger-cassirer-davos-kant>.
29. Strauss (1967, 45–57).

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Atmospheric histories, the sonorous, and the political

Patrick Eisenlohr

Charles Hirschkind's *The Feeling of History: Islam, Romanticism, and Andalusia* is a sophisticated and timely book. Its meditations on the felt dimensions of history are a welcome interrogation of urgent questions of felt truths, given the obvious power of moods and atmospheres in politics and history. Indeed, it appears that somatic and atmospheric apprehensions of the past and related forms of belonging dominate public spheres in many places. Only in academia do such felt connections and resonances inhabit a relatively

marginal position, and are treated as suspect from the standpoints of reasoned debate with their professional and secular standards. For Hirschkind, however, the feelings of history that Andalucismo centres on are full of potential, able to engender new political questions and answers, because 'the horizons of thought and life it opens may be crucial to the task of finding our way beyond the stubborn polarities that continue to threaten our collective existence' (159). One of Hirschkind's main targets in his book are the secular academics, such as the professional historians of medieval Iberia, who do not take such senses of the past seriously enough. *The Feeling of History* is also a plea against the exclusion and excision of Muslims from belonging to Spain, and to Europe at large, given the pivotal role that Spain, and especially Andalusia, has historically played as a frontier between Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. For him, it is impossible to deny the signs, sounds, and other traces of Muslim life that are still palpable in Andalusia. Denying them yields a stunted understanding of what Spain, and by extension Europe, is. Ultimately, Hirschkind's book is about what he calls the 'ontology of Europe', among whose most sensitive points is its relationship to the figure of the Muslim and Muslim ways of life. Like Hirschkind's acclaimed *The Ethical Soundscape*, this is a book about the relationship between sensory experience and ethical life, a study that turns on the links between aesthetics and politics.

Hirschkind shows how the feelings of history that Andalucismo centres on can motivate and undergird a wide range of political and ethical stances. These range from positively recognizing the integrity of Muslims to Spain, to a 'brotherly/sisterly' but ultimately paternalistic recognition of a connection to Muslims as *hermandad*, to justifying Spanish colonization of Northwest Africa. Such feelings of history as palpable in, for example, poetic language, musical sounds, architectural traces, and other signs of life, appear politically and ethically open to a considerable degree. The loose coupling of aesthetics and politics is one of the reasons why the feelings of history are generative of new politics and sensibilities. The diffuse nature of such feelings invests them with so much potential. Yet the same ethical and political openness of feelings of history also has troubling implications, given that ethnonationalist and fascist politics also often rest on feelings of history. Indeed, such politics may find a base in felt connections to certain kinds heritage and its traces, and may not rest on much else. The reverberations of such felt connections become the focus of aesthetic elaboration.

The prominence of sonic metaphors in the *Feeling of History* is not coincidental, given the centrality of musical traditions and practices for the argument. As Hirschkind shows in detail, the *fondo sonoro* is a leitmotif in Andalucismo. It points at shared qualities and elements of Spanish musical traditions and those of North Africa, and takes these as a means to listen to and feel a world in which the Christian and Muslim heritages of Spain are not neatly and hierarchically separated. In my own work, I have found an analytic of atmospheres useful for thinking about the work that music and other sonic practices do. From such a perspective, musical practices emanate atmospheres, energetic flows that are also spatially poured out emotions, and through which, for example, shared worlds such as the *fondo sonoro* of Andalucismo can be sensed in primarily non-discursive ways. Consisting mainly in sonic suggestions of motion, atmospheres are powerful in a diffusely meaningful way. As expressions of particular political or ethical stances, they require further qualification that is often discursive in nature. In other words, applied to the musical ground of Andalucismo, the links between aesthetics and politics operate along a cline of meaningfulness in which the diffuse meaningfulness

of the *fondo sonoro* becomes subject to more qualified and specific forms of signification. This also implies, as Hirschkind's analysis shows, that the atmospheric power of a shared sonorous ground can be qualified into rather different political and ethical directions. As I mentioned, the political implications of this can be troubling, but without their relative vagueness such feelings of history could not capture those they affect in a sensory and aesthetic way. Understanding the link between aesthetics and politics is central to Hirschkind's book. In my view, this also requires coming to terms with the sometimes disturbing political and ethical openness of multifaceted feelings of history.

The Feeling of History is a scathing critique of the widespread European denial to recognize Muslims as integral to Europe. However, 'a feeling of history' is also an excellent shorthand for what fascisms and right-wing ethnonationalisms, with their relative ideological vacuousness, are all about. Such felt and aesthetic connections to the past can provide a base to positively recognize the existence and belonging of the marginalized and disempowered. But they can also furnish somatic evidence and support for the repressive projects of majorities and state authorities. In the Spanish case, *limpieza de sangre* (purity or cleanliness of blood), like other radical projects concerned with purity, the body, and the body politic, is first of all a profoundly sensory and aesthetic appeal and not merely a set of political and legal propositions. Felt connections to Nordic myths and the ancient Germanic tribes of Scandinavia and what are now the German lands, roundly dismissed by modern professional historians, have inspired majoritarian forms of belonging, some of them extremely troubling, in different places, and continue to do so. The music of Richard Wagner that aesthetically evokes this lost world, with its notorious implications in German history, is a good example of the political and ethical openness of such sonorous memories. Take Francis Coppola's use of Wagner's *The Ride of the Valkyries* from the 1870 opera *Die Walküre* in his 1979 film *Apocalypse Now*. The emotionally gripping and diffuse meaningfulness of the music spreads a lionizing of battle and sheer martial power, citing the myths and imagined worlds of ancient Germanic tribes, a celebration of slaughtering the weak from above, along with a profound critique of the United States' war in Vietnam, and of war in general, all at the same time.

Returning to Muslim Europe, the factual, sensorially palpable evidence of Muslim European rootedness and legacy may not sway those post-Ottoman Greek, Bulgarian, or Serb nationalists who position their own felt histories against the figure of the Muslim. If anything, the all too familiar traces of intimately known Muslim life may even motivate them to go to greater lengths in excising the Muslim from the kind of felt nationhood and the particular sense of history that resonates with them. The same can be said about Hindu nationalists, where the undeniable presence of the Muslim as the very familiar and intimate other often provokes a similar political and ethical stance. In contrast, felt connections to a mythical Hindu golden age before the spread of Islam in India and its legacies, a feeling of history clearly dismissed by modern historians, are what modern Hindu nationalism revolves around. Feelings of history are no effective critiques of other feelings of history if there is no substantial shared ethical and political ground. As such, Hirschkind's Andalucist Romantic genealogy that he draws on to argue for the Muslim integrity to Europe may not necessarily convince purist Spanish national Catholics and their counterparts throughout Europe. Ultimately, Hirschkind's plea for recognizing Muslim integrity to Europe is psychoanalytical. For Hirschkind, denying and repressing the presence of Muslim ways of life is, as he quotes the Spanish cultural historian Américo Castro, *vivir*

desviviéndose 'living by denying the reality of one's existence'. According to such reasoning, repression and denial is problematic, yields a stunted existence, and may even lead to violence. But those engaged in the exorcism of the intimate other as an act of purification may not share such psychoanalytical notions of health and integrity, or disavow the violence they deem necessary for purification.

One of the questions that Hirschkind's eloquent dissection of the felt and aesthetic dimensions of history opens up for me is what, after the deconstruction of liberalism, can critically mediate between conflicting Wittgensteinian forms of life. These comprehensive forms of life, a recurrent theme in the book, with their language games and somatic dimensions, can be infused by different feelings of history. More precisely, what do we make of the fact that even shared feelings such as those provoked through common sonorous grounds are subject to divergent qualifications, leading in rather different political and ethical directions? It is a vexing and unresolved question that poses itself in Europe and other parts of the world, such as India, where conflicts around religious diversity and the relationships between religious majorities and minorities are urgent issues. How can one defend the political and ethical stance of positively acknowledging Muslim integrity to Europe Hirschkind lays out in his book against counterfeelings of history, especially those of an enraged or aggrieved majority?

A particular strength of the *Feeling of History* is that it gives central place to the sonorous as a vastly underappreciated dimension of history. Pointing to the sonorous, among other aspects of aesthetic life, it underlines the lived connections that history revolves around, connections to the past that are highly consequential, but often difficult to render into discourse. This is a highly evocative work that helps us understand better the importance of the somatic dimensions of history. It will also make us better equipped in facing the often uncomfortable fact that the feelings of history Hirschkind describes come in the conflictual plural, and that even shared feelings can support rather different political and ethical positions. For the inclusion of the marginal and the disempowered, such as the Muslim forms of life of Europe, normal academic and secular history with its denial of feelings of history is not the only problem. The danger is also, and especially, in the feelings of history in other forms of life, such as religious majoritarianism, ethnonationalism, and fascism. The ethical and political stances derived from feelings of history are often at odds with each other, as the question of Muslim Europe vividly testifies.

Sonorous Foundations

Martin Stokes

Charles Hirschkind has led the most important anthropological thinking about listening in recent years. So, it is both gratifying and exciting, for me as a musicologist, to read a book of his engaging so directly with music. Andalusian music is introduced in the very opening paragraph, one of various signs of an 'anachronistic Mediterranean ... binding one side of the sea to the other' (1). Chapter three, 'Sounding Out the Past' is entirely devoted to it. It is a beautiful book. It will initiate a highly productive conversation between anthropology and musicology concerning history. I instinctively agree with his conclusions: that music is where we might encounter a 'sense of history', understood neither as a relic nor as a construction, but as affective material with which we might make a present rich in

critiques and possibilities. I have long been an advocate of Nietzsche's dictum, '*il faut méditerraniser la musique*', so I am instinctively drawn towards his subject matter, too. I think I would have arrived at his conclusions in a different manner, however. I am not sure how much that matters. But let me trace that route over the course of a few paragraphs here, and see, at the end, how those instincts fare.

Firstly, let me clarify his specific arguments about music, because, in a short book, they are necessarily highly compressed. Three propositions, he shows in Chapter 3, have dominated the study of Andalusian music (*cante jondo* in particular). One, following Federico García Lorca, is that it is the voice of the 'exiled and persecuted', that is to say, the voice of the *gitano* (Roma) and the defeated Morisco, understood as the dynamic presence of Muslim culture. A second, following Catalan composer Felipe Pedrell, is that the music brought to Spain by the Arabs was essentially Byzantine music. The Arabs in Andalusia contributed little of substance, in his view, essentially little more than vehicles transferring the music of one Christendom to another. A third, that of composer Manuel De Falla, walked a cautious line between the two. He saw the 'influences' on *cante jondo* as many and various. But he also saw a distinct Andalusian contribution, detectable in music on both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar. Hirschkind notes the precarious nature of this position. De Falla was later to turn to neoclassicism and drive the Andalusian elements he had once championed out of his own music.

Rethinking De Falla and his latter-day followers, Hirschkind proposes the idea of a *fondo sonoro* ('sonorous foundation') connecting musical practice either side of the Straits of Gibraltar. He understands this as 'a territory of aesthetic and affective connection' allowing *andalucistas* 'to shape a vision of history outside the normative political geography of Spain and its European career' (103). What follows in Chapter 3 is an account of projects for recuperating medieval Andalusian music in Granada, focusing first on writers (mainly Blas Infante and his critics) and then on living musicians (in particular Javier, Ahmed, and Carmen, whose various paths have converged on the Tetería Tetuán in Granada). He mentions, in passing, the fascinating story of Aziz Baluch, who had travelled from Sindh to Gibraltar in the 1930s, was struck by the resemblance of flamenco to his local Sufi music, stayed and devoted his life to it.³⁰ The reconstruction of medieval Andalusian music by people like Javier, Ahmed, and Carmen may well, in the present day, have been shaped by 'world music' and by the local tourist industry. But it would be a mistake, Hirschkind argues, to assume these determine or exhaust the matter.

From a musicologist's point of view, two quite complicated notes have already been struck. One is the use of spatial metaphors (and the significant term 'territory', at 111) at the outset of an argument about music's relationship to time and temporality. The second is a language of 'affordances' (111, 112, 123, and elsewhere in the book). The music in question, for Hirschkind, is understood to 'mobilize' ethical and aesthetic sensibilities, sensibilities that spring to life in conversation and (verbal) reflection with his interlocutors. A third, concerning 'performance', quickly follows. The category of performance, for a musicologist, conventionally embraces matters such as voice, embodiment, interactions with listeners, improvisation, the 'interpretation' of text or model and other such things. Discussion of performance here, however, concentrates almost exclusively on a rather specific 'composition' (118), later qualified as an 'improvisation' (126). This is the addition by Javier's ensemble of a *kharja* (a closing sequence, translated here into Spanish) to a well-known *muwashshah*, 'Lamma Bada Yatathanna'. Hirschkind

interprets this, cogently enough, as an extension of a principle of heteroglossia deeply rooted in the genre, and Andalusian culture more generally.

Things get more significantly more complicated at the end of the chapter, however. Firstly, Hirschkind turns to Du Bois. Du Bois heard his great-grandmother singing an African melody as a child, forcing him to acknowledge, for the first time, the vivid presence in his own life of an African history he had hitherto consider remote and irrelevant – and a related ‘temporality of suffering’ (19). He then turns to Wittgenstein. Music for Wittgenstein, Hirschkind reminds us, was neither a representation nor an abstraction. Wittgenstein saw it, rather, as being saturated with the ‘language games’ that make up a ‘way of life’, thereby addressing the limitations of a formalist musical hermeneutics. Du Bois, Wittgenstein, and Agamben (mentioned earlier in the chapter) could all be said to share an interest in how music, beyond language, might ground the ‘feelings and moods’ on which (to continue paraphrasing Agamben) ‘thought and action’ subsequently build (110). This is a fascinating trio to assemble on this particular subject, particularly when we view them from the perspective of a common romanticism – a sensibility Hirschkind wants to inhabit, critically, and not dismiss. They all could be said to start with a problematization of music’s (othered) relationship to ‘language’, a problematization rooted very much in their particular times and cultural milieux. My question is how helpful this all is, though, in understanding Javier, Ahmed, and Carmen’s world.

Javier, Ahmed, and Carmen seem to speak candidly about their lives and their music, and Hirschkind clearly listens to them carefully and thoughtfully. But the ethnomusicologist in me feels a need to start elsewhere. Ethnomusicologists learn, in particular, to contextualize such conversations in musical *practice*, meaning not just performance, but everything that needs to happen for a musician to get to that point – instrument manufacture and mastery; training, apprenticeship and pedagogy; the acquisition of technical and conceptual knowledge, an operational grasp of sound systems, skills in the management of audiences, patrons, media, grants, and so forth. Ethnomusicologists will often submit themselves to a rigorous musical apprenticeship, learning instruments or vocal styles at the feet of recognized masters. The process can take decades. It would have been interesting to have had this kind of angle on Javier, Ahmed, and Carmen’s music-making. Hirschkind tells us about their musical training, about the musical roads that led them to where they are, and about their hopes and dreams as musicians. But I don’t, however, get much sense of their craft routines, of how they practice, rehearse, experiment with materials, listen to one another and their instruments, talk to one another, engage with teachers, expert listeners and broader audiences and so forth. With the new *kharja* of ‘Lamma Bada Yatathanna’, fascinating case study though it is, we are led very quickly – too quickly I feel – from the making to the meaning.

I would also have been interested to know exactly what ‘improvisation’ means in this context. For Hirschkind, it links, at a rather general level, musical creativity (as in the *kharja* composition) to ‘the nomadic, volatile, itineraries of many of the traditions’ leading exponents’ (127). Though ‘improvisation’ is a clumsy and imprecise word from a musicological perspective at the best of times, an effort to pin it down, and, indeed, try one’s hand at it, can often reveal important things about the distribution, and temporality, of creativity – who, exactly, can ‘create’, how, when, where and with what. In the – closely related – *maqam* practices of Egypt, for instance, as I have discovered over years of *qanun* (zither) learning, it involves the acquisition of a distinct ‘sensibility of temporality’

(Abeysekere's phrase, cited by Hirschkind at various points in this book). Here is a tiny example. In learning *'taqasim'*, an improvisatory practice, one discovers, eventually, how correctly placed and duly weighted pauses can, by 'chunking' melodic sentences in a cumulative way, contribute to a kind of 'quickenings' and intensification. This 'sensibility of temporality' is, without doubt, the hardest thing to learn. It is entirely counterintuitive. For a Western-trained musician such as myself, who might well start by transcribing an example of it, the reverse might appear to be the case – pauses, after all, 'slow things down'. If I get it right (a big if) I will receive a small round of applause from a (knowledgeable Arab) audience and know that I have made that sensibility momentarily vivid to my co-auditors; they, through their applause, have fed it back to me and made it real. The process of learning this 'sensibility' occurs as it does in many crafts: working from models; experimenting, listening, talking and jamming with peers; learning (the hard way), with an ensemble, from mistakes on the job. As already mentioned, it is time-consuming. But one learns in the process that time, or, at least, a 'sensibility of temporality' is also something we can make in music, and that this 'making' might be mastered for aesthetic and communicative ends. The materials and processes of this are observable, tangible and audible craft practices.

Hirschkind's book is not intended as an ethnomusicological monograph and it would be hopelessly parochial on my part to judge it as one. But the exercise in thinking this book through in such terms helps me locate some questions beyond his conclusions – conclusions, as stated earlier, that I instinctively agree with. They may already be apparent but let me express them as succinctly as I can in conclusion. One is whether the spatial metaphor of sonorous 'territory' complicates or obscures a view of the *making* of 'the feeling of history', particularly its making in music. As mentioned above, this is something I would have wanted to establish by observing, over a period of time, its *crafting* in Javier, Ahmed, and Carmen's hands – and perhaps those of others, for the sake of variety. A second concerns whether Hirschkind's reading of Agamben, Wittgenstein, and Du Bois, a reading intended to return music to 'ways of life', might actually end up doing exactly the reverse. Combined, they suggest music is 'special' in epistemological terms, uniquely revealing perhaps, but also uniquely problematic, requiring constant negotiation with its 'abstraction', its word-resistant, non-representational semiotics. The ensuing problem is a kind of romantic hermeneutics that will always, ultimately, sequester music. Many, working on related musical traditions, have simply ditched the word 'music' in favour of 'song' for exactly this reason.³¹ That might have worked here. A third is whether the tendency to see music and language as intrinsically 'different' encourages a compensatory, and potentially reductive, reliance on certain well-trodden linguistic and literary projections concerning Andalusian (and, by the way, Arab and Turkish) musical aesthetics. '*Saudade*' (melancholy), celebrated by Infante, and coming up often in the book, is the key example. Anyone who has played or sung such music will tell you there is joy in it as well as melancholy, and, within that melancholy, nuances and shades of it that matter deeply. '*Saudade*' itself – a purportedly 'untranslatable' word³² – in fact translates widely around the Mediterranean in musical contexts and cries out for separate treatment. Here, too, participation in and observation of the crafting of the musical performances can be helpful, because performing musicians spend a great deal of time worrying about mood and its management.

Notes

30. Baluch's most assiduous biographer is Gibraltarian scholar Stefan Fa; see Currin (2020) for a short article about both Fa and Baluch, containing sound recordings of the latter.
31. Tomlinson's work is particularly relevant here. See Tomlinson (1999).
32. See the reference in Cassin et al. (2014), one that merits some kind of comparative musical exploration.

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'Si todo en el mundo sueña'

Stefania Pandolfo

Three millennia into the future, many eons after the city of London had 'drowned' and was reclaimed by the sea, abandoned by its inhabitants when the ground had slowly begun to sink, and the city of Granada was erased from the face of the earth by a sudden and devastating volcanic eruption that had taken everything and every life; after what once were the iconic landmarks of the European continent had become but a series of archeological sites, an archeologist and a poet set off to visit the ruins of Granada, and engage on a philosophical debate on the character of its afterlife. Fast forwarded into the future, it is a time when the distance between the destruction of Pompeii by the eruption of the volcano Vesuvio and the destruction of Granada by a new volcano that had broken open the crust of the earth and had swallowed everything on its path during the first 'metal' or technological age (between 1900 and the 2030 AC, our epoch) had become imperceptible for those recalling the two events, for both were in a distant, almost pre-historical past. Thus begins the speculative fiction by Angel Ganivét, 'Las ruinas de Granada', published in 1899, an uncanny 'baroque' (as it was also called), or proto-Surrealist short story, which takes a prominent place in the concluding chapter of Charles Hirschkind's *The Feeling of History*, and which coloured for me the experience of reading his book, adding another layer of resonance with questions that animate my own work. The poet and the archeologist (or '*sabio*', wise/reasonable person), perhaps also two sides of the same split subject, have a radically different experience of ruination and mode of relating to the past. For the archaeologist, fascinated by the possibility of encountering a previous civilization in a fossil state, or in the knowledge that can be deduced from mummies (as in a section of the story: the mummies of the technological age, ourselves in the twenty-first century), at stake is the search for a snapshot of a life petrified at the moment of its disappearance. For the poet, on the other hand, ruins are the site from which the poetic word can emerge, not from oneself, but from the other, and can be received in the mode of listening, as the reception of a post-human voice, the song/lament, and the murmuring, of the dead and the unborn. What is

encountered in the rubble of Granada centuries after the disaster that destroyed it, for the poet, is *'una otra forma de vida'*, 'another', or a 'new form of life', a 'life in which humans are no longer necessary'. We may be reminded of Freud's 'On Transience' (1916), where the psychoanalyst (also a *sabio?*) debates with a poet about the experience of loss and in the disillusionment of war, and the poet offers a melancholic reflection on the incurability of the wound of existence, which is itself an opening to receptivity to other possible presents and pasts. Or we may think of W.E.B. Du Bois's own speculative fiction 'The Comet' (1920) where in the apocalyptic vision of catastrophe striking New York City in the form of a comet that kills its inhabitants with its toxic fumes, a confrontation with the violent real of race can be (if fugitively) imaginalized.

The Feeling of History: Islam, Romanticism, and Andalusia is a compelling study of the complex afterlife of Muslim Iberia in present-day Spain, and of the way that inheritance – excluded and denied in Spanish national culture – is instead mediated and channelled by a modern counter-historical tradition of *'appassionati'*, the *Andalucistas*. These are a lineage of Spanish writers, poets, historians, journalists, and activists, who since the end of the nineteenth century and into the present have cultivated a passionate attachment to the universe of al-Andalus and Spain's Muslim past; have mourned its loss, heard its voices, and honed a capacity to feel and reactivate its presence at the heart of modern Spanish life and polity, as a painful 'tear' in the homogenous texture of Spanish identity.

Over the span of eight hundred years – between 711, when in the official narrative a small contingent of Arab Muslim soldiers crossed the Mediterranean from what today is Morocco to Spain, and 1492, when the Castilian Catholic armies subdued the city of Granada, the last Muslim kingdom, after a siege – a large portion of Iberia lived under Muslim rule. Al-Andalus is the name of Muslim Spain and of the heterogeneous culture that flourished during that time, witnessed in poetic, philosophical, medical, scientific, architectural, and artistic masterworks: the theosophy of Ibn `Arabi, the Aristotelianism of Ibn Rushd, the philosophy of history of Ibn Khaldun, architectural works such as the Umayyad Mosque of Granada (itself echoing the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus), the Nasrid palace of the Alhambra, the poetic forms which travelled across languages and genres, are among the multiple cultural offspring of al-Andalus. With the Catholic 'Reconquista', Iberian Muslims, known as Moriscos, were either expelled or forced to convert to Christianity, enduring relentless persecution by the Holy Inquisition, until their final expulsion in the seventeenth century, when tens of thousands found refuge in the Maghreb, and many remained in hiding in Spain. Those who remained, in the words of *Andalucista* historian Rodrigues Ramos, were forced to forget, and then to forget that they had forgotten.

In Hirschkind's reckoning, the *Andalucistas'* lives and journeys, which often included long sojourns in the Maghreb and Middle East, in some cases permanently moving there – as did most recently the Spanish writer Juan Goytisolo, who died in Marrakech in 2017 – are a living witness to the generative capacity of that forgotten Muslim past: not as absence or a ghostly trace, but as a co-presence, a latency and a potentiality, an inheritance materially encoded in buildings and artefacts, in language and dress, in bodily postures and expressions; in modern Spanish culture as well, unbeknownst to itself. It is a living yet concealed inheritance that those equipped with the necessary trained sensory and psychic capacities can recognize and feel, inhabiting the Muslim Andalusian chronotope in a living anachronism, or a temporal warp, a tear in the fabric

of linear homogenous time, which can thereby be experienced as a space of mourning (in Walter Benjamin's sense of the term), and can provide a 'connection', a bridge, between distant yet parallel universes.

In this sense, the book is also a reflection on the deathly existential and political consequences of disavowing the Spanish Muslim past, along with the lives of the Muslim 'neighbors', and of the dangers of becoming disconnected from the past in general. Indeed since the end of the nineteenth century *Andalucistas* interpreted the 'maladies' of Spanish modernity and the decline of Spanish culture, all the way to the ills of Catholic nationalism and the violence of the civil war, as the consequence of a loss: the loss of the capacity to 'experience', and the progressive inability to be receptive and feel the Andalusian Muslim and Jewish past. In the words of Angel Ganivet (d. 1899, Introduction and Chapter 4), a founding *Andalucista* poet, the loss of the capacity to think-with-the body (which he called the 'synthetic sense') resulted in a state of apathy and numbness (*abulia*), and a weakening of the will, which led to inability to relate to the past creatively, by 'vivifying it in relation to a changing present' (25). And Blas Infante (Chapter 3), a prominent *Andalucista* scholar of music and Andalusian nationalist, wrote in 1924 of 'untreated historical wounds', and spoke of the persecution and expulsion of the Moriscos in the seventeenth century as a historical injury committed against the people of Andalusia: a wound from which contemporary grievances drew their force. Two decades later Américo Castro, a charismatic figure of the *Andalucista* movement, wrote of 'existential alienation' (*vivir desviviéndose*) and of the severance from sensory experience of the world, as pathologies related to the loss of the way medieval Muslims, Jews, and Christians once lived in creative patterns of mutuality (*convivencia*). Indeed, Hirschkind tells us, from the perspective of the *Andalucista* it is as if the Spanish capacity to feel was literally and metaphorically lost or disabled with the persecution and the expulsion of the Moriscos (Muslims who has been forced to convert to Christianity). The pursuit of 'feeling', then, as a rivivification of the senses, and of culture as a creative and living inheritance, is shown to be an existential, ethical, and political task. It goes hand in hand with the capacity to become receptive to another world, in this case to the legacy of the Muslim past as the murmuring of an Other within. Receptivity to the past is the result of relating to a wound – the wound of the Other who is almost-myself, and to experience what Rodriguez Ramos, a contemporary *Andalucista* – describes as 'the Morisco trace we carry inside', both as a living legacy, and as the painful awareness of an 'amputation', an amputation that is both a wound also a 'bridge' between parallel violated or unrealized pasts and futures. Feeling, in this tradition, is also the (trained) capacity to feel the pain.

All this is of urgent political relevance today, in view of the exclusions and racist ethno-nationalist temptations of 'Fortress Europe', with its closed borders and ports, and the thousands of migrant lives drowned in the Mediterranean. Many in Spain see the arrival of undocumented migrants from the Maghreb as a threat and a second Moorish invasion, and justify the 'immunization' of Europe in that sense. What would it mean for 'Fortress Europe' to be able to feel, and receive, the heteronymous and heterotopic legacy of its Muslim past?

The Feeling of History is hence also a wider reflection on the nature and modalities of historical memory as such, and what it means to inherit a collective trauma and imagine possible futures from within that space of ruination, in contexts where a contested sense of belonging is related to a historical catastrophe and the 'questions' that are born of it.

Alluded to and at moments explicitly invoked in the book are the Muslim question in today's Europe, the Black question and anti-Black racism in the US in the disavowed memory of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and the complex history of Israel/Palestine.

Even though historical wounds and the possibility of a 'historical therapeutics' (as Hirschkind dubs it) are at the forefront of the story, traumatic memory is not treated in the book within the familiar lexicon and institutional discourses of trauma and reparation. Instead it is addressed, following the *Andalucista* intuition and style, as we saw, as 'feeling'. In this sense, the book's conceptual framework can be seen as an extension of Hirschkind's long-term investment in the anthropological study of the senses, embodiment, and aurality, and the consequences of their disavowal in the secular age, from his book *The Ethical Soundscape* to many of his later contributions – an attunement to sound, in particular, which returns here in one of the most remarkable chapters, 'Sounding Out the Past' (Chapter 3), where the possibility of encounter with the chronotope of Al-Andalus is discussed with the concept of '*fondo sonoro*', 'a common sonorous foundation', understood as a potential territory of aesthetic and affective connection. Yet in *The Feeling of History* the problem of 'feeling' opens as well into new and uncharted directions, where feeling and passion are approached as ways of inhabiting the aporetic experience of a 'difficulty of reality' (Cora Diamond), and pain exceeds the capacity of the sensorium and is crystallized and released as cry, in the sound, and the melody of the Andalusian *canto jondo*: a 'deep song' of sorrow, best expressed in what Hirschkind calls the 'voice', and in the poetry of Garcia Lorca (Chapters 3 and 4), which at once feels the amputation and connects with the dead.

At issue is an enigmatic call of the past, which animates the lives of those who can *feel* and *hear* – intermediaries and mystics of sorts – a call that sometimes leads to conversion. In Hirschkind's words: '*Andalucistas* find themselves interpellated by Islam in ways that defy understanding within the conceptual world they inhabit, and this limit in turn gives impetus to their form of inquiry, reflection, and practice' (50).

Alongside the *Andalucistas* and their poetic works, Hirschkind's 'guides' in his sensory exploration of the temporal warps of al-Andalus include W.E.B. Du Bois (in *The Souls of Black Folk* and his autobiography, *Dusk of Dawn*), who found inspiration in the voice of Black slaves and the 'deep song' of their Spirituals, and who could feel a connection to the African continent in the melody he heard a child from his grandmother – a connection that in turn illuminated his understanding of American racism; and Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose *Philosophical Investigations* and especially his *Notebooks* are central for the exploration of pain at the limit of speaking and 'showing', and of how 'my pain' may be 'felt in another's body': a key insight, short of a psychoanalytic perspective, for thinking the anxious question of the legacy of Muslim pain in the body of Spanish culture; as well as Wittgenstein's musical notion of the 'tonality of a form of life', and his suggestion, as Hirschkind tells us, that attachment to the past might be experienced as a kind of 'love' (21). Wittgenstein's notion of 'showing' and 'presentation', in its relation to pain, and the conundrum of a 'difficulty of reality', are also central to Hirschkind's stylistic choice of constructing the book as a series of portraits, which he describes as 'biographical images' (we may think of pedagogical genres of hagiography, but also, of images as inherently aporetic, and recalcitrant to appropriation). This is for two reasons. On one hand the biographies 'show' something that defies discursive representation, the sought-after experience of a co-presence with al-Andalus, in lives marked by the pain

of the other and the violent legacy of the expulsion (from Spain and from memory); on the other hand, and in a sense explored by Talal Asad in his writings on Christian monasticism and Islamic law, it is in the pedagogical modality of the 'example' that a tradition lives and is passed on. Yet in this book, Hirschkind's extended conversation with Asad is also explored in a more personal style, as the biography and burial-site in Andalusia of Asad's father Muhammad Asad (Leopold Weiss prior to his conversion, and who became a major voice in the history of modern Islam) becomes a poignant image of the arc of the book.

The question of feeling, and of the *Andalucistas'* passionate attachment to the past as experienced in the mode of melancholy, opens onto the question of Romanticism. At stake is the status of historical knowledge, of fact and fiction (in the words of Vico and Koselleck), and the role of Imagination and the imaginative faculty in the account and the experience of the past. In Hirschkind's book there is no attempt to excavate the medieval Muslim past as an archival historical fact: that task is left to the Spanish Arabist scholars (Chapter 2), who, not unlike Ganivet's '*sabio*/archaeologist', seek objective 'knowledge' rather than embarking on a quest for 'experience'. Contemporary Spanish historians are indeed suspicious of the *Andalucistas'* passionate attachments, which they interpret as a romantic phantasy and an Orientalist and nationalist distortion of reality. In his conversations with the Spanish Arabist historians, guardians of the border between the present and the past, Hirschkind can hear an anxiety related to the memory of the Francoist era and the Spanish Civil War, which is projected on the problem of the retrieval of the Muslim past. If that buried-potential past were to resurface in the space and time of modern Spain, where would it go? It might refuel the passions of the civil war, with scenes of children choosing opposing parties in classroom discussions, and violence would erupt between the Catholic and the Muslim camps.

The Romanticist thesis is important in the book, which also – if implicitly – opens anew the space for an imaginative historical anthropology. *Andalucistas* such as Américo Castro are indeed influenced by German Idealism, as well, perhaps, by other traditions of the 'imaginative faculty' that made it possible for him to imagine a 'Third Spain' as a potential space, at once co-present and parallel. They are committed to the project of encountering the real through a work of 'poesis', and to the training of receptivity through the sensory imagination. It is such trained receptivity that makes possible an encounter with the Other, and the recognition of a common painful predicament. And it is poesis that enables the positing of alternative heterotopic cartographies, structured by novel configurations of time and space, condensed images of past and future. Gil Benumeña's chronotope of '*Mediodía*' (Mezzogiorno, MIDDAY, the Middle, or the South) as a hybrid space of inter-Mediterranean exchange and solidarity is a powerful example, connecting Egypt to Spain, and beyond, onto the futuristic possibilities issued from a felt connection with al-Andalus (Chapter 1); or the poetic visionary explorations of Angel Ganivet in his *Las ruinas de Granada*, where the ruins of age-old Muslim architecture are not experienced as the document of a bygone past but instead engender the 'futuristic-atavistic' vision of the contours of a new body, a body beyond human life. And Lorca's writing his '*Divan del Tamarit*' in the poetic forms and rhythm of the Arab *qasida* and *ghazal*. Andalusian sadness in the lament of *la pena negra* (the black dread) was for Lorca an opening of the heart, an open historical sensibility for Iberia's painful Muslim past; it was a melancholic incision that inaugurated the 'openness to alternative presents'.

The Feeling of History is a remarkable work, profound and generative, in the arc of its argument, and the attention to the complexity of the scenes it paints for us. Its author is at once an ethnographer, an acute reader of historical and literary works, a listener to music with the capable ear of a musician, and, in a certain way, a 'seeker' with an affinity with the *Andalucistas* whose complex lives bear perhaps some resemblance, *mutatis mutandis*, to the lives and work of anthropologists. The book makes an original contribution to the anthropology of historical consciousness and the historical unconscious; it furthers Hirschkind's work on the senses by adding an important reflection on aesthetics and receptivity in the work of culture, and in particular the centrality of music for the imagination of alternative worlds; and by taking seriously the *Andalucista's* 'speculative' explorations of place and time, and their insistent attachment to the Islamic tradition in the midst of Europe, it draws the outlines of a different cartography, the geography of another history.

Returning to Ganivet's uncanny 1899 short story 'Las ruinas de Granada', as the archaeologist and the poet contemplate the ruins of Granada from the sky in an aerostat, the mundane gaze of the '*sabio*' discerns the literal topography of a bygone history (the river, the castle, the cathedral, the bridge), while the poet can 'see', imaginalized in the rubble, the shape of a human body, the face, the crossed arms, the head merging with citadel that was once the Alhambra, the Nasrid palace at the time of another destruction, namely the expulsion of the Muslims and Jews from al-Andalus. It is an apocalyptic vision of both death and life, reminiscent of eschatological scenes of Last Judgement in Christian and Islamic eschatology. The poet grasps the visionary and painful configuration of another world, a world beyond human life and consciousness, which, Ganivet tells us, gives itself in the mode of the dream (*sueño*). *Sueño* is to be understood in the strong sense of a cosmic experience, one where the self is divested of its individuality and mundane historicity, and is surrendered to another time, where life and death are no longer opposed, and bygone and unrealized histories can be given a second chance. As we can grasp from Ganivet's narration, in that cosmic dream a kind of awakening happens for the soul. It is an awakening of trauma to reality and to alterity, signalled by the mechanical-yet-spiritual intervention of an 'ideophone', a musical instrument or a machine, which can become a bridge across incommensurable space-time and establish a sonic link with the disappeared. Even though the short story recuses itself from directly pointing to Quranic vocabularies of human and divine existence, the concluding lines of 'Las ruinas' speak of the dream as what in Arabic is called *ru'ya*, a visionary disclosure of divine reality, where dreaming is a modality of the cosmic imagination, and of the universe as divine self-disclosure, in the terms of the twelfth-century Andalusian Ibn 'Arabi, in life and death, in flesh and stone. Ganivet's provocation, or exhortation, to open one's life to the beyond of life, to the 'new life' in the rubble, and to the cosmic dream, is both a political critique and a mystical experience: '*Si muerte y vida son sueño, si todo en el mundo sueña, yo doy mi vida de hombre por soñar, muerto en la Piedra.*'

I lost paradise twice
so expel me slowly,
and kill me slowly,
under my olive tree,
with Lorca

– Mahmoud Darwish, 'The Adam of Two Edens'

A response

Charles Hirschkind

The five essays on *The Feeling of History* gathered here put into question, in a very generous and generative manner, different aspects of the argument I presented in that book, and I am deeply grateful to the authors for their thoughtful engagement with my work. In different ways, they have helped me to see certain features of my own analysis that I hadn't fully taken stock of, and have also attuned me to those junctures in the text where that analysis becomes strained or under-developed. For example, while I had noted the prevalence of musical and spatial metaphors in the discourse of Andalucismo, I had not thought enough about the way my own reliance on these same metaphors informed my arguments. In other words, these essays – as strange as it sounds – have allowed me to better observe and understand my own thinking, both in its clarity and opacity.

While there are many important points raised by these essays, each in the end narrows its focus to one particular aspect of the book and I will address my responses primarily to these issues of primary concern. I want to start with a question raised by Patrick Eisenlohr in his thoughtful commentary on the book, a question concerning the political indeterminacy, and thus peril, intrinsic to 'felt histories' of the kind I explore among the *andalucistas*. Highlighting the risk entailed in my attempt to take seriously the claims of Andalucismo, he writes: 'what do we make of the fact that even shared feelings such as those provoked through common sonorous grounds are subject to divergent qualifications, leading in rather different political and ethical directions?' Eisenlohr calls attention to the way passionate engagements with the past, such as that I examine in *The Feeling of History*, have a prominent place among fascist and ethnonationalist movements, including, today, the Hindutva and Serbia nationalist movements (and one could extend the list with ease).

The concern Eisenlohr raises is serious, and I appreciate the way he cautiously and carefully articulates the problem without rushing to answer it. There is a stronger version of the argument, one Eisenlohr does not take up, though one that I heard on occasion from historians in Spain, that goes as follows: while politically progressive movements may at times ground their claims in what, for shorthand, I'll call passionate histories, recourse to this form of historical engagement is far more prevalent on the right, and thus, any book that extends legitimacy to this phenomenon is both irresponsible and dangerous. In other words, once the discipline of history's claim to be the sole arbiter of the truth of the past is thrown into question, one has opened the door to a dangerous relativism, a tool for enthusiasts, opportunists, and ideologues. Or again, once you have challenged the historian's ability to adjudicate between rival versions of the past, between historical fact and passionate imagination, you have deprived yourself of the critical tools necessary to counter opportunistic deployments of historical falsehood, from which we are constantly under threat.

The arguments put forth in *The Feeling of History*, as Eisenlohr recognizes, are in no way meant as a blanket endorsement of such 'felt histories'. (Moreover, this term, 'felt histories', overgeneralizes, as if there were two distinct genres of historical argument, felt and rational (or objective), when, in actuality, all accounts rely, to varying degrees, on the resources of both feeling and reason, or more correctly, on felt reason). However, what is important to note here, a point insistently made by the *andalucistas* themselves, is that it is not just passions that unleash the dangers of history; that danger comes from

the side of secular historiography itself as well. Let me clarify this point, taking as an example the history of the Caribbean slave trade. Let us imagine two accounts of (or rather, responses to) the Middle Passage, one cast in the modality of a voice crying out in pain, the other, a painstaking account of the heterogeneous social and economic conditions that gave shape to this event. While acknowledging that these contrasting versions are simplified to the point of caricature, I want to ask: which of these opposing accounts is more dangerous, irresponsible, inexact, or, to borrow Austin's term, infelicitous? Might we not say that the dispassionate version, for all of its commitment to the protocols of historical evidence and representation, is more dangerous and irresponsible to the extent it emotionally sanitizes an event which, in the current context of our lives, 'cries out to be heard'? My point here, to summarize, is simply to suggest that there is no epistemological trump card by which to decide, *avant le lettre*, the adequacy of an account, the way it meets, or fails to meet, our needs as persons and as societies constitutively vulnerable to the past.

The tensions I explore in my book between the narratives of the *andalucistas* and those proffered by professional historians of the Andalusian past find echoes across many regions and national contexts, as Rajbir Judge reminds us in his instructive comments on the historiography of colonial and pre-colonial India. As in contemporary Spain, explorations of alternative histories of the Indian subcontinent frequently draw the charge of romanticism or Orientalism from scholars nervous about the dangers of essentialism, the attribution of deep roots to present-day identity formations. I am grateful to Judge's insightful survey of the political stakes that weigh so heavily on current engagements with South Asia's many historical legacies, stakes that have become ever more difficult to navigate with the intensification of the Hindu nationalist movement under the Modi regime.

I am also thankful for Judge's perceptive comments on the cartographic thinking that undergirds much of *andalucista* discourse, and on my own repeated reliance on spatial terminology in attempting to take stock of that discourse (a point also alluded to in the essays by Stokes and Fancy). Judge reads this insistence on the cartographic (both my own and that of the *andalucistas*) as marking a limit on the tradition's (and the text's) ability to move beyond the orbit of a secular ontology, and thus, to more radically interrogate the forms of sovereign power that, in some ways, gave impetus to the tradition of Andalucismo in the first place. He writes:

It seems to me that Andalucismo and other alternative imaginaries confine possible beginnings to an immanent location, which can subsequently be overcome by another regional organization. There is in *andalucismo*, perhaps, a *regionalization* of God in much as there was a humanization of God and natural religion during the Enlightenment.

Judge contrasts this immanentizing imperative of Andalucismo with a set of scholarly engagements with Islam that foreground the concept of an 'Elsewhere', a space, articulated within Islamic theological and mystical traditions, that lies between existence and non-existence, and thus beyond the reach of human comprehension and mastery. Against the Promethean impulse of the secular and its drive to render the worldly adequate to the divine, scholars working within this line of inquiry (Omnia El Shakry, Amira Mittermaier, and Mohamad Meziane are referenced in the text) bring our attention back to the theological limits of this enterprise.

To a certain extent, I can see what Judge means in noting that the discourses of Andalucismo participate in a 'regionalization of God', a point also echoed by Hussein Fancy when he reminds us that a number of prominent *andalucistas* have distinguished 'Islamic civilization' from the 'practice of religious faith', with only the former being seen as integral to an Andalusian inheritance. That said, it is worth remembering that Andalucismo is not a tradition of inquiry concerning God, nor even Islam, for that matter. It is a lived response, both intellectual and practical, to the challenge of inheriting a past that has been lost, obscured and erased, and that therefore is only partially available to human knowledge, a past forged by Muslims, as well as Jews, Christians, Roma and others. From this standpoint, the cartographic impulse is one essential element of the tradition within which this response has been practiced and honed; listening to Flamenco, as well as to North African music, is another element within that tradition, as is the pilgrimage-like practice that brings *andalucistas* repeatedly to North Africa and the Middle East. These practices do not enable *andalucistas* to overcome the occlusion of the past, the trauma left by its violence and erasure; only to live it as sanely as possible. In short, when Judge says 'the past that is released is an unruly visitor, one that eludes even our bodily habituation', I want to say, exactly, and Andalucismo is one tradition by which inhabitants of Southern Spain have sought to accommodate themselves to this predicament.

Judge's concern about a kind of ontological flattening effected in the book by the prevalence of spatial metaphors finds an interesting echo in the excellent essay by the ethnomusicologist Martin Stokes. For Stokes, the foregrounding of a geographical imagination does not impoverish the space afforded to the divine, but rather, the space assigned to music in the text. The highlighting of musical 'territories' or 'geographies' comes at the cost of exploring how the complexities of musical know-how and practice are transmitted and acquired, how, that is, musicians learn to cultivate and craft precisely the 'sensibilities of temporality' – the feeling of musical time – so central to the arguments in the book. As Stokes emphasizes, the cultivation of such temporal sensibilities by musicians takes considerable time and effort:

The process of learning this 'sensitivity' occurs as it does in many crafts: working from models; experimenting, listening, talking and jamming with peers; learning (the hard way), with an ensemble, from mistakes on the job ... one learns in the process that time, or, at least, a 'sensitivity of temporality' is also something we can make in music, and that this 'making' might be mastered for aesthetic and communicative ends.

Stokes makes a strong case as to why my exploration of Andalucismo would have benefitted considerably had I paid closer attention to the materialities, the forms of expertise and apprenticeship, and the styles of practice that went into the craft of music-making among the musicians I discussed in *The Feeling of History*. I have to agree. Moreover, the fact that I lack the kind of ethnomusicological expertise such a project would require does not in any way deflect the serious issues Stokes raises. But Stokes acute assessment of the musicological gaps within my book also leads me to ask the following question: had I undertaken the sort of close study of musical practices Stokes describes, how would the results of that study have contributed to the interpretation of Andalucismo I put forward in the book? Let me state this question another way: how does the practical feel for musical time cultivated by the musicians that I worked with relate to the sensibilities of temporality that enable *andalucistas* to recognize and inhabit that

'third Spain', forged at the nexus of Al-Andalus and contemporary Andalusia? Inasmuch as musicians have contributed to the fashioning of the sensibilities undergirding the historical geography posited by this tradition – and indeed, they have, as I argue in the book – then a study of the conditions of knowledge production specific to their craft would certainly be germane to any work on Andalucismo. But most *andalucistas*, including many who have emphasized the significance of Andalusian musical genres for the tradition, are not themselves musicians; rather, they are part of a large Andalusian public that find themselves deeply attached to these musical forms and have come to hear and feel in them a sense of a traumatic history to which they belong. From listening to, and observing, Flamenco performance, they have cultivated a feeling for the way a past soaked in pain and loss is integral to their lives. This 'sensibility of temporality', I want to suggest, is not absorbed directly from the sense of musical timing practiced by the skilled Flamenco musician, but from a wider set of practices that are part of audience members' daily lives, of which musical performance is but one.

In making this distinction between the skills of musicians and those of their audience, I am not rejecting Stokes' point that a deeper knowledge of the conditions of music-making, of the kind an ethnomusicologist might achieve, would enrich my analysis. Rather, I am only attempting to clarify why, given my paucity of musical training, I still felt justified in writing about musical sensibilities undergirding Andalucismo. In hindsight, I think I could have been clearer in the chapter 'Sounding out the Past' about the approach I was taking to musical practices, and the relation of musical expertise to the broader view of Andalucismo I was developing.

In his insightful reflection on my book, the historian Hussein Fancy invites us to step outside the text to consider the broader, mid-twentieth-century philosophical debates that any assessment of Andalucismo must navigate. To do so, he dedicates much of the essay to the ideas of the literary scholar Americo Castro, a key figure of reference within the discourses of Andalucismo. Influenced by mid-century existentialists and phenomenologists, Castro's innovative reading of the literary culture of early-modern Iberia sought to 'supersede the limits of both historicism and Romanticism', as Fancy reminds us, in order to trace the formative moments in the evolution of the Spanish soul.

Through his reading of Castro and the broader philosophical project Castro contributed to, Fancy arrives at the conclusion that attempts, such as Castro's, to produce a theoretical resolution to the oppositions between subjectivity and objectivity, Romanticism and historicism bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment are bound to fail. 'We must reject', he concludes, 'any attempt to solve the problem, to derive an overarching theory'. We might interpret this statement to mean that the past cannot be made the monopoly of one particular epistemological tradition, that there are multiple, both historicist and Romantic, histories to be written, and that such a plurality of perspectives should be embraced. My book, to the extent it sets an *andalucista* reading of the past against what are seen to be the shortcomings of a historicist treatment, can be seen to inject an unhelpful antagonism into the field of Iberian studies. Indeed, Fancy is worried about the way such epistemological oppositions can become mobilized politically, creating dangerous divisions where they wouldn't otherwise be. As he starkly and rather ominously puts it: 'This habit of thought, which cuts like a butcher, setting one ideal against another, tearing past from present, had and continues to have violent consequences'. It is

hard not to read this as the desperate plea of a historian faced with the daily task of having to navigate the intensely conflictual terrain of Iberian studies.

I am sympathetic to Fancy's call here. But to be clear: *The Feeling of History* does not explore, nor does it attempt to enact, a theoretical resolution to the Enlightenment tensions Fancy highlights. Rather, the book examines a tradition of practice and reflection integral to a particular way of life, one founded on a felt engagement and exploration of an inheritance only partially available to knowledge. Proponents of this tradition, the *andalucistas*, are not making an argument or forwarding a theoretical standpoint but seeking to accommodate their lives to this inheritance.

As I suggested at the outset, there is a lot to be learned in seeing one's own work through the eyes of another. In this regard, I find Stefania Pandolfo's sensitive commentary on my book to be immensely instructive, her unique and profoundly insightful perspective on historical trauma illuminating my own attempt to write about the task of inheriting a historical wound. In particular, Pandolfo brings out, perhaps with greater clarity than I did, the link between pain and agency that informs my reading of the *andalucista* tradition, the way a vulnerability to a traumatic history makes possible, not just subjective feeling, but a distinct practice of imagination. As she writes,

The Feeling of History is hence also a wider reflection on the nature and modalities of historical memory as such, and what it means to inherit a collective trauma and imagine possible futures from within that space of ruination, in contexts where a contested sense of belonging is related to a historical catastrophe and the 'questions' that are born of it.

To 'inhabit that space of ruination', as the *andalucistas* do, is not a passive act but one that requires considerable effort, skill, especially in light of the apparatus of forgetting that has been extended over Iberia's Muslim and Jewish past. As Pandolfo puts it succinctly, 'Feeling, in this tradition, is also the (trained) capacity to feel the pain'.

I find Pandolfo's reference to a 'trained capacity to feel the pain' among the *andalucistas* to be a particularly useful formulation. Notably, we find a similar reference to such trained capacities in Talal Asad's discussion of the concern for pain exercised by early Christians. Commenting on the work of the historian Judith Perkins, Asad writes:

the Christian embrace of suffering led, she tells us, to a greater concern for – and therefore a new kind of secular activity directed at – the diseased, the poor, and the despised members of society. If Perkins is right, then we find here not merely another meaning of pain but also another economy of action. (Asad 2003, 87)

Much like Asad's reading of Christian pain, Pandolfo's gloss on my exploration of Andalusismo invites us to consider the *andalucista* discourses on a painful inheritance in terms of the capacities of imagination that inheritance enables and the 'economy of actions' it sustains. The renowned poet and *andalucista*, Federico Garcia Lorca, suggested a similar understanding in a comment made during his sojourn in New York: 'I believe that being from Granada inclines me to a sympathetic understanding of persecuted. Of the Gypsy, the Negro, the Jew ... of the Morisco that we all carry inside' (cited in *Feeling*, 142).

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